

APPENDIX B2. STUDIES & INFORMATION

*Very Draft Under Development June 15, 2015
Section III.C.1, Informal Citizen Interviews, Updated July 7, 2015*

Justice System & Public Safety Services Study Design: 2015



Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee

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2015

APPENDIX B2. STUDIES & INFORMATION

Justice System & Public Safety Services Study Design: 2015

Outline

- I. PURPOSE
- II. JUSTICE SYSTEM & PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES ISSUE SCOPE OF WORK
 - A. Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society
 - B. Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee
- III. PROBLEMS/ISSUES
 - A. Introduction
 - B. Issues
 - 1.1 Preliminary June 14, 2015 JS&PSS
 - 1.2 Range of Alternative Types of Taxpayers Funding Public Safety Program
 - 2. Preliminary July 15, 2015 JS&PSS Issues
- IV. RELEVANT STUDIES & INFORMATION
 - A. Studies
 - 1. Oregon State University Rural Studies Program
 - a) Educational Brochures From Oregon State University Rural Studies Program
 - b) Example Potential Affected Condition Elements
 - 2. Oregon Governor Kulongoski's Task Force & Subcommittee
 - 3. Oregon Criminal Justice Commission
 - 4. Association of Oregon Counties
 - 5. Oregon Secretary of State
 - 6. Others
 - B. Josephine County Sheriff's Office
 - C. Media
 - 1. The Grants Pass Daily Courier (TGPDC)
 - 2. Other Media
- V. OREGON LEGISLATION
 - A. Oregon Senate Bill 77 (2009)
 - B. Oregon House Bill 4176 (2012)
 - C. Oregon House Bill 3453 (2013)
 - D. (2015)
- VI. HISTORICAL FUNDING
 - A. JO CO JS&PSS Funding History: 2000 - 2012
 - B. JO CO JS&PSS Funding History: 2013 - 2015

- VII. JOSEPHINE COUNTY LEVIES
 - A. Josephine County’s Tax Levies over the Years
 - B. Josephine County’s Tax Levies: 2012 - 2015
 - C. Josephine County’s Tax Levies: 2004? - 2011

- VIII. JUSTICE SYSTEM EXPLORATORY COMMITTEE (JSEC) LETTERS TO EDITOR
 - A. Written
 - B. Contemplated

- IX. JSEC EDUCATIONAL BROCHURES
 - A. HNA&HS (HNA) Brochures
 - B. Facts: Issue, Projects, Analysis
 - C. Facts: Josephine (JO) County (CO) Sheriff’s Office
 - D. Facts: Jo Co Justice System Public Safety Services
 - E. Facts: Media
 - F. Facts: Demographics, Budgets, & Taxes
 - G. Facts: Criminal Offenses, Citizen Involvement, & Government
 - H. Facts: Standards
 - I. Alternatives
 - J. Public Officials & Security
 - K. Recommendations

- X. JSEC ARCHIVES: 2012 - 2015
 - A. JS&PSS Issues
 - B. Research
 - 1. Informal Citizen Interviews
 - 2. Media
 - a) The Grants Pass Daily Courier
 - (1) Guest Opinions
 - (a) Guest Opinions Opposing Levies
 - (b) Guest Opinions Supporting Levies
 - (2) Letters To The Editor
 - (a) Citizen Reasons Opposing Levies
 - (b) Citizen Reasons Supporting Levies
 - (c) Additional Letter To The Editor
 - (3) Opinions Editor
 - (4) Reporter Coverage
 - b) Other Media
 - 3. Voters’ Pamphlet
 - a) Arguments Against
 - b) Arguments In Favor
- C. Studies & Information

XI. STUDIES & INFORMATION SUMMARY

XI. PUBLIC REVIEW

XII. AUTHORS

TABLES: APPENDIX B2. STUDIES & INFORMATION

Table I-1. Josephine County, Oregon Levy Votes

Table II-1. Josephine County FTE: FY 04-05 to FY 08-09?

Table II-2. Funding by Public Safety Element?

Historical SRS Payments?

TABLES & APPENDICES: JS&PSS STUDY DESIGN

- Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee. Draft 2015. *Justice System & Public Safety Services Study Design: 2015*. Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society. Hugo, OR.

Justice System Exploratory Committee

Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society

<http://www.hugoneighborhood.org/justicesystemexploratorycommittee.htm>

TABLES

Table?

APPENDICES

Appendix A. Issues

Appendix A1. Being Heard

Appendix A2. All Values Are Legitimate

Appendix B. Affected Environment

Appendix B1. Potential Affected Conditions

Appendix B2. Studies & Information

Appendix B3. Analysis of Management Situation

Appendix C. Alternatives

Appendix D. Standards

Appendix D1. Analysis & Impact Term Standards

Appendix D2. Condition Standards.

Appendix E. Environmental Consequences

Appendix F. Public

Appendix F1. Interest Groups

Appendix F2. Draft Potential Funders & Sources

Appendix G. Public Study

AUTHORITY

Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee. Draft July 18, 2013. *Justice System & Public Safety Services Issue Scope Of Work* (Scope) Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society. Hugo, OR.

Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee. Draft 2015. *Justice System & Public Safety Services Study Design: 2015*. Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society. Hugo, OR.

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PUBLIC INTEREST

As of July 7, 2015 this document was in the development phase represented three overlapping stages of the document development life cycle: 1. Requirement Analysis, 2. Designing, and 3. Developing Content. This document has been web published for the convenience of the authors in reviewing its requirements, designing, and content (Chpt XII).

At this stage it's form is not final, nor is it edited for public review and comment. However, those interested members of the public may provide observations and comments on this document to the authors. Per their inclination, and if they are interested in becoming involved with the work of the Hugo JS&PSS Exploratory Committee, they may apply for committee membership with the authors (Chpt XIII).

APPENDIX B2. STUDIES & INFORMATION

Justice System & Public Safety Services (JS&PSS) Study Design: 2015

I. PURPOSE

A. Background

After the 4th levy failure in as many years, members of the Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee (JS&PSS Exploratory Committee) asked the question, “What can we do to shed some light on the issues?” It decided to document focused “listening” which wouldn’t be scientific; it was just listening to fellow citizens (i.e., what they said and what they wrote). This strategy fit with one of its core beliefs, “*All citizens, voters, and votes are legitimate.*” It was also a pretty good match with the JO CO citizen voting patterns, which were not 50/50, but with a point spread from 2 - 14, the Hugo JS&PSS Committee (Sec. II.B) had felt the levies could go either way (Table I-1).

Table I-1. Josephine County, Oregon Levy¹ Votes						
Levy ²	Voters ³	Votes ⁴		Percentages ⁵		Points ⁶
		Yes	No	Yes	No	
2012	49,561	10,901	14,504	57	43	14
2013	50,944	12,883	13,448	51	49	2
2014	50,655	13,291	14,700	48	53	5
2015	51,143	11,868	13,956	54	46	8

Footnotes: 1. Justice system & public safety service levies, 2. Year of levy, 3. Registered voters in Josephine County, Oregon, 4. Number of registered voters voting yes or no, 5. Percentage of registered voters voting yes or no., and 6. Percentage point spread for registered voters voting yes or no. The source is Josephine County Clerk, Josephine County, Oregon (<http://www.co.josephine.or.us/Page.asp?NavID=754>).

B. Purpose

The purpose of Appendix B2 is to provide supporting material for the JS&PSS grant application as described in the draft document entitled *Justice System & Public Safety Services Study Design: 2015*. The study design project is itself part of a program to research the Josephine County (JO CO), Oregon JS&PSS Issue (2013 *Justice System & Public Safety Services Issue Scope Of Work*).

- Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee. Draft 2015. *Justice System & Public Safety Services Study Design: 2015*. Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society. Hugo, OR.

- Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee. Draft July 18, 2013. *Justice System & Public Safety Services Issue Scope Of Work*. Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society. Hugo, OR.

One of the main purposes of the proposed JS&PSS study grant is to provide grass roots opportunities for JO CO citizens in active citizen involvement (CI) through the design of the study, accessibility to information and education, and to better understand the JS&PSS issue, which is partially driven by the history of revenue sharing from the federal government. The first important step was the identification of the issues by citizens (Appendices A, A1, & A2).

One of the important next steps is to understand the studies and information available, or to be researched, for the area of interest (i.e., the boundaries of interest are primarily those for Josephine County, Oregon).

1. Affected Conditions (Appendix B1)
2. Studies and Information Available (Appendix B2)

The purpose of Appendix B1 is a list of potential affected conditions related to the issues that probably will sustain impacts from one or more alternatives. It is a good beginning point in determining which potential affected conditions to consider in the JS&PSS study design.

The purpose of Appendix B2 is to identify potential affected conditions that have already been identified through existing studies and other information available as probable affected conditions for consideration of identification in Appendix B1.

Once the publically defined issues and alternatives have been defined, the analysis area boundary should be delineated for each affected condition. The analysis boundary could be different for each affected condition. For instance, the direct impacts to employment and for an alternative may be confined to the county. The indirect impacts may be the State of Oregon. Another example concerns the U.S. census units for JO CO and how they might be different groups or geographic areas for different issues (e.g., income, employment, education, incorporated cities and rest of county, food stamps, etc).

Sometimes the analysis boundary for a particular affected condition will change with different alternatives. Fully describing affected environment usually requires knowledge about the extent of impacts, and the description may be refined as impact analysis on a particular proposal proceeds.

“Affected” condition means just that — conditions expected to experience economic, social, physical, or biological impacts. Therefore, you should not bother with drawing analysis boundaries or collecting data to describe resources that are not likely to be affected by the range of potential alternatives.

The potential public JS&PSS issues focus on the social and economic versus the natural and physical. Therefore, impacts on the citizens of JO CO are interpreted comprehensively to include “economic and social environment,” and the relationship of people with that natural and physical environment. This means the focus of the study is economic or social effects, not the natural and physical. However, the natural and physical will also be studied if there is a link to the publically defined issues, such as the physical infrastructure needed for a JS&PSS program (e.g., buildings, roads, etc.).

C. Study Principles

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not legally apply to the JS&PSS study design. However, several of it’s study principals (e.g., issues; alternatives; affected environment; direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts or consequences, etc.) are applicable (Appendix B).

For those affected conditions that will potentially sustain impacts, collecting accurate and adequate data on their present status (e.g., location, nature, condition, scope, size, etc.) is critical in determining impacts, and must be available before helpful analysis can begin. A geographic information system or other mapping system not only can be the basis of excellent analyses, but can help decide how best to develop alternatives. In other words, quality data will help in making understood quality decisions.

What is a social impact assessment? It is not defined yet for the proposed JS&PSS study design. However, there are a variety of definitions of a social impact assessment (SIA). One that will be considered is by the Interorganizational Committee on Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment (1995) as it embodies most of the concepts contained in other definitions. According to the Interorganizational Committee, an SIA is an effort to assess or estimate, in advance, the social consequences that are likely to follow from specific policy actions (including programs, and the adoption of new policies), and specific government actions (including buildings, large projects, and leasing large tracts of land for resource extraction), particularly in the context of the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 or ‘NEPA’” (Interorganizational Committee 1995:12)

Interorganizational Committee on Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment, “Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment.” U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA Technical Memo. NMFS-F/SPO-16, 1994. www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/social_impact_guide.htm (6 July 2002)

Interorganizational Committee on Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment, “Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment.” Environment Impact Assessment Review 15 (1995): 11-43.

Web Search: Social, Cultural, Economic Impact Assessments, A literature review

II. JUSTICE SYSTEM & PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES ISSUE SCOPE OF WORK

Chapter II addresses the philosophies of the Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society (i.e., HNAHS, or Hugo Neighborhood) and the Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee (JS&PLSS Committee). This is the foundation for their interest and work on the Justice System & Public Safety Services issue (JS&PSS Issue).

- Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee. Draft July 18, 2013. *Justice System & Public Safety Services Issue Scope Of Work* (Scope) Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society. Hugo, OR.

Web: *Justice System & Public Safety Services Issue Scope Of Work* (draft July 18, 2013)
Justice System Exploratory Committee
Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society
<http://www.hugoneighborhood.org/justicesystemexploratorycommittee.htm>

A. Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society

- Protect Hugo's rural quality of life by promoting an informed citizenry in decision-making (Scope, p. 2).
- Non-political: will not be involved in politics in the sense of lobbying for the outcome of a public vote of the issues or officials to be elected (Scope, p. 2).
- Believes there is a high probability for another JS&PSS levy to be on a future ballot (Scope, p. 3).
- Believes another JS&PSS levy is reasonable as adequate public safety services (Tables II-1 & II-2) are needed, even though the form and the cost are issues (Scope, p. 3).

B. Hugo Justice System & Public Safety Services Exploratory Committee

- Big picture ideas include the following (Scope, p. 3).
 1. Identifying the JS&PSS issue.
 2. Identifying the JS&PSS sub-issues for research and analysis.
 3. Identifying a range in level of services
 4. Identifying a range of costs for services.
 5. Identifying revenues for services.
- The first job is to define a potential list of issues for analysis. The list will be refined and evolve (Scope, p. 3).
- Recognize that the issues will evolve (Scope, p. 8).
- Purpose is to gather information adequate enough to understand the JS&PSS issues. This includes educational outreach efforts (Scope, p. 4).
- Purpose is limited to investigating, researching, and evaluating the JS&PSS issues. It will not make evaluations of legislative proposals as to "right or wrong", nor make recommendations on how to vote (Scope, p. 4).
- Objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of understanding what is being proposed (e.g., proposed levies, HB 3453, citizen recommendations, other alternatives, etc.) (Scope, pps. 4 - 5).
- Outside scope/mission is to recommend how the citizens should vote on any new ballot pertaining to the issue (Scope, p. 4).

- Independently research the JO CO JS&PSS issue and publicly provide its analysis through web page publications; mission limited to educating its members the best it can and sharing this information publicly (Scope, p. 3).
- Information researched and gathered will be made available to others for their own evaluation (Scope, p. 3).
- Consensus is expected as all minority views can be expressed in planning documents, just as the consensus and majority views in a web published paper or educational brochure (Scope, p. 4).
- A strength is an evolving more comprehensive coverage of the components of the JS&PSS issue. This comprehensiveness increases almost every time a member of the HJSEC talks to one of fellow citizens (Scope, p. 8).
- Comprehensive coverage of issues and other components of analysis web published.
- Comprehensiveness in published educational materials may sometimes appear in conflict with each other (i.e., a lack of a unified position), but it is in fact probably reflecting the different views of citizens (i.e., pros and cons research and web publishing is encouraged) which is part of the mission (Scope, p. 8).
- Adequate information is the goal. An adequate information assessment/analysis has several elements and a conclusion of adequacy (Scope, p. 6).
 - Information Is Understood Or Not
 - Supporting Arguments Are Made Or Not
 - Standard(s) of Review
 - Applicable Evidence/Facts
 - References and Sources of Information
 - Compliance With Adequacy Information Analysis Elements Or Not

Table II-1: Josephine County FTE: FY 04-05 to FY 08-09						
	FY 04-05	FY 05-06	FY 06-07	FY 07-08	FY 08-09	% Chg
Public Safety	140	139	146	142	121	-14%
Sheriff	89	86	88	87	79	-11%
D.A.	21	22	23	22	22	5%
Juvenile Justice	30	31	35	33	31	3%

III. PROBLEMS/ISSUES

A. Introduction

The JO CO JS&PSS Issue is partially driven by the history of revenue sharing from the federal government. The most significant historical revenue sharing method to JO CO was the 1937 O&C Act which established the timber management and revenue distribution scheme to the O&C counties. It lasted over 60 years until 2000 and the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS; P.L. 106-393), which was a temporary, optional program of payments based on historic, rather than current, revenues. The SRS, which decoupled timber harvests from county revenue, provided direct payment to counties from the federal government in lieu of taxes. The 2000 SRS Act originally expired in 2006, was renewed for one year in 2007, for four more years in 2008, and one more year in 2012, though each renewal was at reduced spending levels.

The 2012 expiration of federal SRS payments to JO CO, used mostly for public safety services, resulted in four tax levies as solutions. They all failed. However, there is a high probability for another levy to be on a future ballot. This is reasonable, as public safety services are needed, even though the form and the cost are issues.

1. May 15, 2012 JO CO-wide Primary Election Measure 17 - 43, Criminal Justice System Operations Four Year Local Option Tax (i.e., \$1.99 per \$1,000 of assessed value), failed 57 - 43 percent, Voter Turnout - Total 52.59%; 25,405 votes for Measure 17 - 43/ 49,561 registered voters = 51%.
2. May 21, 2013 JO CO-wide Special Election Measure 17 - 49, Criminal Justice and Public Safety Three Year Local Option Tax (i.e., \$1.48 per \$1,000 of assessed value), failed 51 - 49 percent, Voter Turnout - Total 51.97%; 26,331 votes for Measure 17 - 49/ 50,944 registered voters = 52%.
3. May 20, 2014 JO CO-wide Primary Election Measure 17 - 59, Criminal Justice and Public Safety Three Year Local Option Tax (i.e., \$1.19 per \$1,000 of assessed value), failed 53 - 48 percent, Voter Turnout - Total 56.51%; 27,991 votes for Measure 17 - 59/ 50,655 registered voters = 55%.
4. May 19, 2015 JO CO-wide Special Election Measure 17-66, For Patrol, Jail, Shelter of Abused Youth; Five Year Levy (i.e., \$1.40 per \$1,000 of assessed value), failed 54 - 46 Percent, Voter Turnout - Total 50.65%; 25,824 votes for Measure 17 - 59/ 51,143 registered voters = 51%.

After the 4th levy failure in as many years, the JSEC JS&PSS Committee asked the question, “What can we do to shed some light on the issues?” They believed that the first important step was the identification of the preliminary issues for why the levies failed. The reasons for the levy failures are complex and unknown as facts. However, it is believed the following issues played some significant part, and that the identification of citizen issues is the most important step in developing a successful study design.

B. Issues

1. Br. III.A.1 Justice System Public Safety Service Issue: 2013 The Hugo JS&PSS Exploratory Committee defined the issue in 2013 as reported by public leaders and articles in TGPDC. It was identified in the sense of crime and JS&PSS employees laid off.

- Hugo Justice System Exploratory Committee. July 9, 2013. Justice System Public Safety Service Issue. Brochure IIIA.1 Justice System & Public Safety Services Series. Hugo, OR.

Crime State Rep. Wally Hicks talked about a rising tide of crime in JO CO in the wake of widespread layoffs in the criminal justice system nearly a year ago. The layoffs are the result of declining revenue from timber harvests on federal land, the loss of federal subsidies originally intended to replace the lost timber revenue, and voter defeat of a public safety tax in May 2012 — a tax that was meant to replace the federal subsidy.

90 Employees Laid Off In 2012 federal subsidies expired which had been in place for about 20 years and provided the county with millions of dollars annually. Worsening the situation, a serial tax meant to fill the gap failed. With no new source of revenue, more than 90 employees, most from the Sheriff's Office, were laid off.

Man Not Jailed The fact the man was not jailed, despite having a warrant out for his arrest in a drug-delivery case, is an example of what has happened to JO CO's criminal justice system in the wake of deep budget cuts that took effect last spring and summer, when nearly 90 deputies, prosecutors, Juvenile Department workers and support staff lost their jobs. The cuts have had widespread effects.

By the Numbers (i.e., crime statistics; see brochure)

2.1 Preliminary June 14, 2015 JS&PSS Issues (Appendix A1; Voters & Non-Voters) This list was initially developed by the JS&PSS Exploratory Committee. It would be as supplemented by the Exploratory Committee with information from a non-random set of informal interviews of JO CO citizens, and articles from The Grants Pass Daily Courier.

This preliminary list of issues, not listed in order of importance, will probably change considerably prior to the date of actually submitting an application for a study grant. The test of reality is to first provide a preliminary June 2015 list, a second supplemented July 15, 2015 list, and a final list at the time of grant application.

1. Costs of JS&PSS would increase back to the 2000 level Prior to SRS (i.e., pro levy supporters want the old status quo).
2. Rural Patrol Presence Has Not Changed From 2000 - 2015.
3. Mistrust in Government Growing.
4. Cumulative Assessments Coordinated By JO CO Assessor Office Unaffordable to Many.
5. Citizens Can Provide Their Own Protection.
6. Citizens Feel Their Voices Are Not Being Heard.
7. Lack of Transparency.
8. Opportunities Had Not Occurred To Inform Voters in a Comprehensive Non-Special Interest Fashion.
9. No JS&PSS Business Plan From JO CO Government.

2.2 Range of Alternative Types of Taxpayers Funding Public Safety Program

- Property Taxes.
- Sales Tax
- Flat Taxes.
- Volunteer Payments
- In-County-Only Lottery
- Mix Of Types of Taxpayers

3. Preliminary July 15, 2015 JS&PSS Issues The Hugo JS&PSS Exploratory Committee believes the identification of the preliminary issues for why the levies failed has merit in its own right as a standalone summary of the problem as viewed by the majority of JO CO citizens (i.e., you can't find solutions that last if you don't know the specific problem(s)). The issues identified by the committee were supplemented primarily with information from a non-random set of informal interviews of JO CO citizens, and articles from The Grants Pass Daily Courier (e.g., citizen guest opinions and letters to editor, reporter articles, etc.).

This list of preliminary issues, not listed in order of importance, will probably change further prior to the date of actually submitting an application for a study grant. They are categorized by two ideas identified by the public.

1. Consider a range of public safety funding and service level alternatives, both dollars and staff, and range of type of taxpayer, and
2. Public involvement consultation and criteria issues that should be considered in the design of alternatives.

3.1. Range of Public Safety Funding and Service Level Alternatives includes rough dollar estimates from an enhanced alternative greater than the maximum annual average federal SRS payments to an alternative with zero SRS payments. Only the approximate funding levels will be identified (i.e., see HNA&HS's educational brochures for all categories of the JS&PSS Issue; web page <http://www.hugoneighborhood.org/justicesystemexploratorycommittee.htm>).

Categories of the JS&PSS Program

1. Adult Jail Beds
2. Juvenile Justice Center
3. District Attorney's Office
4. Court Services
5. Rural Patrol Deputies
6. Criminal Investigations & Related Sheriff's Office Support Services (1 or 2 services?)
7. Animal Protection
8. Cost Per \$1,000 Assessed Property Value

Range of Alternatives

- Costs of JS&PSS Increase Significantly Above Old Status Quo 2000 level Prior to SRS: More Than \$15 Million Alternative?
- Costs of JS&PSS May 15, 2012 Levy Measure 17 - 43, \$1.99 per \$1,000 Assessed Value: \$14 Million Alternative?
- Costs of JS&PSS would increase back to the Old Status Quo 2000 level Prior to SRS: Approximately \$12 Million Alternative?

- Costs of JS&PSS May 21, 2013 Levy Measure 17 - 49, \$1.48 per \$1,000 Assessed Value: \$10 Million Alternative?
- 2015 Session of Oregon Legislature, House Joint Resolution 21
- Costs of JS&PSS May 19, 2015 Levy Measure 17-66, \$1.40 per \$1,000 Assessed Value: Approximately \$9 million - \$10.5 Million Alternative?
- Costs of JS&PSS May 20, 2014 Levy Measure 17 - 59, \$1.19 per \$1,000 Assessed Value: \$8.3 Million Alternative
- No Action Alternative - Live Within Your Budget Alternative: Approximately \$7.6 Million?
- Citizens Can Provide Their Own Protection At Current Funding Alternative: No SRS Federal Payments: Approximately 3 Million Dollars?
- Unknown Timber Program Future : Approximately 5 - ? Million Dollars?
- Minimally Adequate level of public safety services Alternative (Oregon House Bill 3453 criteria)
- JO CO Declare Bankruptcy Alternative
- State Implements Oregon House Bill (HB) 3453 Alternative

3.2. Public Involvement Consultation and Criteria Considered In Design of Alternatives

- Public Safety Should Be Paid By Public
- Mistrust in Government Growing: Honesty, Transparency and Accountability
- Citizens Feel Their Voices Are Not Being Heard. What Part Of “No” Don’t They Understand?
- Rural Patrol Presence Has Not Changed From 2000 - 2015; I Don’t Feel More Unsafe Or More Safe.
- Not Fair That Only Property Owners Pay
- Opportunities Had Not Occurred To Inform Voters in a Comprehensive Non-Special Interest Fashion: Planning & Business Plan
- Cumulative Assessments Coordinated By JO CO Assessor Office Unaffordable to Many.
- Not Fair That Only Property Owners Pay
- Promote Economic Development & Education
- Permanent 58 Cents Per 1,000 JO CO Tax & Current Taxes, Fees, etc. As Identified By JO CO Assessor’s Office
- Income & Opportunities Inequity Affects Ability To Pay/Multiple Overlapping Socio-Economic Issues Affect Ability to Pay Taxes, Fees, Etc.
- City and County Residents Should Pay Their Usage Share

Summary from Appendix A, Section III.F?

IV. RELEVANT STUDIES & INFORMATION

The following studies were used by the Justice System Exploratory Committee in its research and development of its educational brochures (Chpt. V). They are listed by author. They are considered very important, but not necessarily the definitive identification of relevant studies and information to consider for the proposed JS&PSS study design.

A. Studies

The information provided for each study was provided from one or several of the identified educational brochures. The purpose was to provide an example(s) of potential affected condition elements for inclusion in the study design.

1. Oregon State University Rural Studies Program

2006. *A Guide to Oregon Community Indicators: Social, Economic and Environmental*

Beleiciks, N., & Weber B. (2006). *A Guide to Oregon Community Indicators: Social, Economic and Environmental*. RSP 06-04, Rural Studies Program Working Paper Series. Corvallis, OR.

Support for this project was provided by the Ford Family Foundation under contract to Oregon State University Rural Studies Program.

a) Educational Brochures Based On Oregon State University Rural Studies Program No educational brochures were developed. Examples of over one hundred indicators (i.e., affected conditions) available for Oregon counties and communities from the study follow. They are all accessible online.

b) Example Potential Affected Condition Elements Quality information is key to understanding the needs of a community and designing a sound plan of action to meet those needs. Measures of social, economic, and environmental progress help citizens understand the vitality of their community, and identify where the community is heading. The purpose of this guide is to inventory and characterize existing sources of information about rural communities in Oregon. The data from these sources are in the form of, or can be used to create social, economic, and environmental community indicators.

Appendix A contains tables listing existing indicators pertaining to social (Table A.1), economic (Table A.2) and environmental (Table A.3) concerns. The social community indicators make up the largest group of community indicators. Social indicators represent the people of a community and serve to gauge the quality of their lives. Demographics, health, education, housing, and safety are included in the social group. The largest source for social indicators is the U.S. Census Bureau, which is extremely detailed, but limited in timeliness because the Census is conducted only once a decade.

The Profile of General Demographic Characteristics is a population summary of the raw data collected by the U.S. Census every 10 years. The Census Bureau creates volumes of demographic tables based on the information in the DP-1.

- Measures: Population by sex and age, race, race combination, Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, Household relationships, types and size, Housing occupancy, and Housing tenure
- Geography: State and county, MSA, census tract, ZIP code, American Indian Area

- Frequency: 10 years
- Format: Online tables and downloadable Excel, .csv, .txt, and .rtf
- Access

Traditional economic indicators are readily available for large communities from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Census Bureau. Economic indicators are easy for government agencies to generate as a by product of tax collection program expenditures. Due to confidentiality restrictions however, the availability of these data tend to degrade at the small community level. The Community Economic Toolbox and Northwest Income Indicators Project use government sources of data to create county economic indicators in an easy to use format.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis produces the Regional Economic Information System (REIS), which is the main source of personal income data. Personal income levels are reported annually and available at the county level. Industry data is provided according to NAICS classification. A state level proportional breakdown between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas is also available.

- Measures: Personal income, population, per capita personal income, Personal income and employment summary, Personal income and detailed earnings by industry, Compensation by industry, Total employment by industry, Regional economic profiles, Total wages, wage employment, average wage per job, Personal current transfers, Farm income and expenses.
- Geography: State and county level, MSA, BEA areas, and state level metropolitan and non-metropolitan proportions
- Frequency: Annual
- Format: Online tables and Excel compatible .csv downloads
- Access

2008. *Federal Land Management and County Government: 1908-2008 - A Report of the “Changing Federal County Payments Policy and Rural Oregon Counties: Impacts and Options” Project*

Adams, V., & Gaid D. M. 2008. *Federal Land Management and County Government: 1908-2008 - A Report of the “Changing Federal County Payments Policy and Rural Oregon Counties: Impacts and Options” Project*. Rural Studies Program Working Paper Series. Corvallis, OR.

Financial support for this project was provided by: Association of Oregon Counties, The Ford Family Foundation, and Eastern Oregon Rural Alliance.

a) Educational Brochures Based On Oregon State University Rural Studies Program No educational brochures were developed.

b) Example Potential Affected Condition Elements

Many Oregon counties with substantial shares of their land in Federal forests have depended on shared revenues from Federal forest lands for significant portions of their county government revenues. Over the past several decades, a number of forces have converged to disrupt the historical patterns of funding for county government services in Oregon. New voter-initiated limitations on property taxes were put in place in the early 1990s as Federal government forest management practices and national policies constrained the timber harvest on Federal land and thus the harvest-based revenues that had been shared with county government. These changes introduced a considerable amount of uncertainty into county finance, and expiration in 2007 of legislation that authorized the Federal forest payments to counties seriously threatened the fiscal capacity of a majority of Oregon counties. Many county governments in Oregon entered fiscal year 2008-09 with the prospect of having to implement drastic cuts in services. Six of the 36 counties faced cuts of more than 30 percent in their general funds, and eight faced cuts of more than 50 percent in their road funds. (Association of Oregon Counties, 2008, p. 4)

Beginning in 1993 Congress attempted to counter the declines in payments to counties by restructuring the county payments policies to decouple payments from the harvests. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 and then the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-393) (hereafter SRS) stabilized payments to counties and schools by providing payments to counties based on receipts during years with historically high harvest levels. The SRS provided payments to counties and schools in 42 states. In Oregon, the SRS safety net payments went to 33 of 36 counties. Funding to counties tied to Forest Service lands must be used on county roads and schools (with a specified share being passed through directly to schools), while funding tied to Bureau of Land Management lands can be used for general purposes. Title I of the Act (providing 80% to 85% of total payments) funded a general safety net for county services and schools. Title III funded search and rescue and fire protection and other county services related to Federal forest lands. Title II expenditures, guided by local Resource Advisory Committees, supported projects aimed at restoration of public lands and nearby private lands. In the analysis that follows, only Title I and Title III payments are considered “discretionary” county funds since Title II funds remain in Federal accounts.

The original SRS act expired in September 2006 and a one-year extension of the SRS expired in September 2007. This meant that final payments would have been received during the 2007-08 county fiscal year ending June 30, 2008. Despite efforts by the Oregon Congressional delegation and others, counties entered the 2008-09 county fiscal year without SRS funds.

Our analysis in this paper estimates what the impact on Oregon counties would have been if Secure Rural Schools funding had not been continued. Table 1 shows the SRS payments to counties for 2006-07 and thus the expected annual net loss of revenues if SRS payments had ended. This estimate is net of the harvest-

based payments that the counties would continue to receive under the original revenue sharing formulas, assuming that harvest receipts from Federal lands remain at the average of the last eight years.

Table 1: SRS Payments to Counties and Schools, 2006-07 and Net Loss from Termination of P.L. 106-393
The impact of the expiration of the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (P.L. 106-393) was estimated using IMPLAN1. IMPLAN is an economic input-output model that provides estimates of inter-industry purchases and sales in a regional economy, and allows the estimation of impacts on the regional economy of external “shocks” such as changes in Federal payments or export sales. In this study we used the 2006 database, the most current data available at the time we began the analysis.

2009. *Economic Impacts on Oregon Counties of the Termination of the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act: An Update*

Sorte, B., Lewin P., & Weber B. February 2009. *Economic Impacts on Oregon Counties of the Termination of the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act: An Update*. A Report of the “Changing Federal County Payments Policy and Rural Oregon Counties: Impacts and Options” Project. Corvallis, OR.

Financial support for this project was provided by: Association of Oregon Counties, The Ford Family Foundation, and Eastern Oregon Rural Alliance.

a) Educational Brochures Based On From Oregon State University Rural Studies Program No educational brochures were developed.

b) Example Potential Affected Condition Elements

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Table 2 shows the estimated revenue loss to each county with the termination of P.L. 106-393 payments.

2009. Local Government Responses to Fiscal Stress: How do Oregon Counties Compare?

Adams, V. March 2009. *Local Government Responses to Fiscal Stress: How do Oregon Counties Compare?*. Rural Studies Program Working Paper Series. Corvallis, OR.

Financial support for this project was provided by: Association of Oregon Counties, The Ford Family Foundation, and Eastern Oregon Rural Alliance.

a) Educational Brochures Based On From Oregon State University Rural Studies Program

No educational brochures were developed.

b) Example Potential Affected Condition Elements

Cyclical Vs. Structural Fiscal Stress

Structural Factors in Oregon

Tax System

Timber Payments and Revenue Sharing

Rural Economic Base

Surveys of Local Government Responses to Fiscal Stress

Table 1: Revenue-side Fiscal Stress Responses

Table 2: Expenditure-side Fiscal Stress Responses

Table 3: Other Fiscal Stress Responses (Efficiency & Market)

Results: How Do Oregon Counties Compare?

Table 4: Revenue-side Responses

Table 5: Expenditure-side Policies

Table 6: Other Policies

Governor's Task Force Recommendations. The Governor's Task force on Federal Forest Payments and County Services has identified actions that local governments in Oregon should take to help themselves in anticipation that Secure Rural Schools funding will phase down and expire after FY 2011. The first recommended action is utilizing what tax capacity that remains within the constraint of Measure 5. The second is creating tax districts for essential services such as law enforcement and emergency services. The third is utilization of option levies.

Service districts and option levies both require approval by voters. It is noteworthy that the Governor's Task Force's primary recommendations are for property tax increases and creating new tax districts that require voter approval. Both are likely to meet stiff voter resistance, particularly in the most severely affected counties that have relatively low property tax rates and have had low rates for many years. The Task Force does not see much opportunity for further spending and service cuts, or much further revenue potential in policy actions that are easier to implement and that counties have used in the past four years: drawing down fund balances and fee increases.

Conclusion. For decades prior to the anticipated termination of the Secure Rural Schools funding in 2008, many Oregon counties had been experiencing fiscal stress brought on by expanding populations and voter-approved limits on the property tax system. It is clear from the OSU SRS Survey of 2008 that, for at least the past four years, counties have been adopting strategies to raise non-tax revenue, cut and reorganize services and create new institutional arrangements for county service delivery. It is also clear from our review of studies of responses to fiscal stress in other states that Oregon counties have adopted many of the strategies used in other states. While some policy responses in another states may not be either feasible or possible in Oregon local governments, counties may wish to take another look at some of these alternatives.

Appendix A: Selected Data on County Fiscal Condition and Adjustments from the 2008 Secure Rural Schools Survey

2009. *Changing Federal County Payments and Rural Oregon Counties: Analysis of Policy Impacts and Responses from Loss of Secure Rural School Funding in Selected Oregon Counties*

Gaid, Dawn Marie, October 2009. *Changing Federal County Payments and Rural Oregon Counties: Analysis of Policy Impacts and Responses from Loss of Secure Rural School Funding in Selected Oregon Counties*. RSP 09-04. (134 pages). OSU's Rural Studies Program. Working Paper Series. Corvallis, OR.

a) Educational Brochures Based On Oregon State University Rural Studies Program

Br. IIIH.5	OSU'S Rural Studies Program (RSP) & JS&PPS Documents
Br. IIIH.5.1	OSU'S RSP: Changing Federal County Payments and Rural Oregon Counties
Br. IIIH.5.2	OSU'S RSP: Federal Forest Revenue Sharing Policies
Br. IIIH.5.3	OSU'S RSP: State of Oregon Property Tax Policies
Br. IIIH.5.4	OSU'S RSP: Factors Affecting County Policy Impacts and Responses
Br. IIIH.5.5	OSU'S RSP: Changes in Funding, Staff, and Service Levels from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions by JO CO: 2005 - 2009
Br. IIIH.5.5.1	OSU'S RSP: JO CO Funding Changes from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions: 2005 - 2009
Br. IIIH.5.5.2	OSU'S RSP: JO CO "STAFF" Changes from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions: 2005 - 2009
Br. IIIH.5.5.3	OSU'S RSP: JO CO "Service Level" Changes from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions: 2005 - 2009
Br. IIIH.5.6	OSU'S RSP: Anticipated Impacts on JO CO and Possible Responses from Loss of FFP: after 2009
Br. IIIH.5.6.1	OSU'S RSP: Impacts on Well Being from Reductions in Public Safety: After 2009
Br. IIIH.5.6.2	OSU'S RSP: Impacts on Financial & Political Implications from Loss of FFP: After 2009
Br. IIIH.5.6.3	OSU'S RSP: Lack of Confidence and Trust in Government from Loss of FFP
Br. IIIH.5.7	OSU'S RSP: Oregon State University Rural Study Program Conclusion

b) Example Potential Affected Condition Elements

Br. IIIH.5.1 OSU'S RSP: Changing Federal County Payments and Rural Oregon Counties

The specific objectives of the RSP study follow

1. Understand Federal and State Policies Impacting County Revenues
 - Federal Forest Revenue-sharing Policies
 - Federal forest revenue-sharing policy
 - Sea change in federal land management
 - Decoupling of federal forest payments from harvest receipts
 - State Property Tax Policies
 - Measure 5
 - Measure 50
 - Impacts of Measure 5 and Measure 50
2. Understand and Compare Selected Counties and Factors Affecting Policy Impacts and Responses
 - Geographic, demographic, economic, property tax, political, land ownership, and federal forest payment structures
 - Changes in funding, staff and service levels from loss of federal forest payments
 - Business, institution, and resident impacts and responses to changes

Br. IIIH.5.2 OSU'S RSP: Federal Forest Revenue Sharing Policies

Understanding federal policies impacting county revenues are integral to understanding the JS&PSS issue.

Sea Change in Federal Land Management. Historically, counties with extensive federal lands received a large share of their revenues from USFS and O&C administered lands. The revenue sharing arrangement functioned as intended from 1908 into the 1980s. In recent years, Federal timber sales dramatically declined due to market conditions, legislation, and legal decisions, reducing the revenues to counties. In the 1990s, the continued cutting of old growth began to conflict with the Clean Water Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and most importantly, the Endangered Species Act. The Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP), adopted in 1994 to preserve the northern spotted owl was the culmination of a nearly decade of forest management policies aimed at sustainable management of late-successional forests, but which resulted in large declines in harvest on federal land. With implementation of the NWFP and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, and another economic recession in the early 1990s, harvests on federal lands in Oregon dropped precipitously.

The long-standing nature of these revenue sharing arrangements and the steady loss of federal timber revenues caused counties dependent on the natural resource economy to experience significant budget shortfalls.

Br. IIIH.5.3 OSU'S RSP State of Oregon Property Tax Policies

State Of Oregon Property Tax Policies. Property taxes represent the largest source of locally-generated general revenue for local governments, both nationally and in Oregon. Property taxes are collected by local governments to support schools, roads, law enforcement, fire protection, libraries, parks and other services. Oregon's property tax system is uniquely limited by two voter-passed constitutional amendments – Measures 5 and 50.

Impacts of Measure 5 and Measure 50. In the late 1980's, federal forest payments were roughly equal to tax levies received by county governments in Oregon. After passage of SRS which fixed federal forest payments following the steady decline of timber harvest receipts during the 1990s, local property tax levies continued to climb under the control of Measure 5 and Measure 50.

In 1991, twenty-five of Oregon's 36 counties received federal timber payments that were half or greater than their property taxes. By 2007, only six counties continued to rely on timber payments to this extent.

Br. IIIH.5.4 OSU'S RSP: Factors Affecting County Policy Impacts and Responses

Factors Affecting CO Policy Impacts And Responses

- Geographic, demographic, economic, property tax, political, land ownership, and federal forest payment structures.
- Changes in funding, staff and service levels from loss of federal forest payments.
- Business, institution, and resident impacts and responses to changes.

Baseline. The study began with an analysis of existing county financial data for an established "baseline" year through FY 2008-2009 with assistance from the primary financial contact for each selected county. The baseline year was considered to be the one prior to the year major changes in staffing and service levels were made in response to the anticipated loss of SRS funds, which varied by county (page 29).

BASELINE YEAR: FY 2004 - 2005

Changes in Funding From Loss of Federal Forest Payments (FFP): Policy Decisions by JO CO: 2005 - 2009 JO CO began making significant changes in anticipation of the loss of SRS payments beginning with

the FY 2005-2006 budget. FY 2004-2005, therefore, is considered the baseline year for the purposes of the study in this county. Reorganization of CO management structure through the reduction and elimination of positions and departments, reduction of benefits, privatization of programs, and the proposal of bond levy options and tax districts to voters were among the actions taken by the county. The CO began building reserves in the General Fund (GF) with the FY 06-07 budget to allow them to operate through the FY 08-09.

Definition Of Financial Condition. For purposes of another study in 2012, *Oregon's Counties: 2012 Financial Condition Review*, the state defined financial condition as a local government's ability to maintain existing service levels, withstand local and regional economic disruptions, and meet the demands of natural growth, decline, and change.

OREGON LEGISLATION ON CONDITION TO BE MEASURED

2009 Enrolled Senate Bill 77, Section 1 If the county is in a state of fiscal distress that compromises the county's ability to **provide a "minimally adequate level of public safety services" (MALPSS)** the governing body or the Governor may seek a declaration of a public safety services emergency (PSSE)

2012 House Bill 4176, Section 1. If the county is providing, or within the next fiscal year will be **providing, "a less than minimally adequate level of state-required services,"** the Governor shall declare a fiscal emergency for the county.

2013 Enrolled House Bill 3453, Section 2 If the Governor determines that fiscal conditions exist, or are imminent in one or more counties that compromise the ability of the affected counties to **provide a "minimally adequate level of public safety services,"** he may proclaim a PSSE.

OAR 213-070-000. The standard for a MALPSS for all three bills is a comparison between **the historic baseline level of PSS to the current level of PSS.** A PSSE is a situation in which a CO is in a **state of fiscal distress** that compromises the CO's **ability to provide a MALPSS.**

Br. IIIH.5.5 OSU'S RSP: Changes in Funding, Staff, and Service Levels from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions by JO CO: 2005 - 2009

The specific objectives are starting to understand JO CO and factors affecting changes in funding, staff and service levels from loss of federal forest payments.

This brochure is an overview of funding, staff, and service level changes followed by an educational brochure on each of the three factors.

1. JO CO Funding Changes from Loss of FFP
2. JO CO Staff Changes from Loss of FFP
3. JO CO Service Level Changes from Loss of FFP

Br. IIIH.5.5.1 OSU'S RSP: JO CO Funding Changes from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions: 2005 - 2009

Changes in Funding From Loss of Federal Forest Payments (FFP): Policy Decisions by JO CO: 2005 - 2009 JO CO began making significant changes in anticipation of the loss of SRS payments beginning with the FY 2005-2006 budget. FY 2004-2005, therefore, is considered the baseline year for the purposes of the study in this county. Reorganization of CO management structure through the reduction and elimination of positions and departments, reduction of benefits, privatization of programs, and the proposal of bond levy options and tax districts to voters were among the actions taken by the county. The CO began building reserves in the General Fund (GF) with the FY 06-07 budget to allow them to operate through the FY 08-09.

Since the GF receives the greatest share of the SRS payments, it has also been subject to the greatest changes. **Between FY 04-05 and the FY 08-09 budget, the GF revenues declined by 68 percent and expenditures by 57 percent**, while Road Fund revenues declined by 47 percent and expenditures by 11 percent. The changes to the GF and Road funds are summarized in Table 8 of the OSU working paper.^{5&6}

The decline in expenditures reflects a number of actions taken by JO CO in anticipation of the loss of SRS payments, particularly those impacting the GF. Through FY 2005-2006, Public Safety (Sheriff, District Attorney and Community Justice – Juvenile and Adult) and Health and Human Services (Public and Mental Health) were primarily in the GF.

In FY 06-07, a new Public Safety Fund was established that consolidated into one fund the departments of Sheriff, District Attorney and Community Justice. The largest source of revenue for this fund was the O&C portion of SRS, which is transferred from the GF. Other revenues are primarily charges for services and various federal and state grants. In FY 07-08, Community Justice was reorganized into two divisions – Adult Corrections and Juvenile Justice. Adult Corrections was formed from several related programs within Community Justice and is fully supported by grants from the State with no GF support. Juvenile Justice remains in the Public Safety Fund, along with the Sheriff and the District Attorney. In FY 08-09 the primary source of resources to operate the offices in the Public Safety Fund was approximately half of the \$12 million one-year (07-08) extension of O&C funds carried over from FY 07-08 and a transfer of \$3.9 million from the GF. Public Safety is projected to receive \$3 million from the GF for FY 09-10 through FY 12-13. The changes to GF/Public Safety Fund are summarized in Table 9 of the OSU working paper.^{5&6}

In FY 06-07, Mental Health Services were privatized and stopped receiving GF support. The largest source of revenue for this fund is grants from the state with no GF support, similar to Adult Corrections. Change in revenues and expenditures for FY 04-05 thru FY 08-09 for the departments referenced in the previous discussion, that received or previously received GF support, is grants from the state with no GF support, similar to Adult Corrections.

Sheriff The criminal justice system in JO CO is comprised of departments of the Sheriff, District Attorney, Juvenile Justice, and Adult Correction, which cooperate with the 14th Judicial District Circuit Court. While each department is integral to the functioning of the public safety system as a whole, the Sheriff's office plays a central role. The Sheriff's office provides services for **operating the jail, court security, patrol, detectives, emergency management, search and rescue, civil, records & communications, and evidence and administration**. The operations of the Sheriff's office are vital to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.

Change in revenues and expenditures for FY 04-05 through FY 08-09 for the departments that received or previously received GF support, are summarized in Table 10 of the OSU working paper.^{5&6} As an example, the following are budgeted expenditure declines for FY 08-09 since FY 04-05.

- Sheriff -13%
- District Attorney -12%
- Juvenile Justice -10%

Br. IIIH.5.5.2 OSU’S RSP: JO CO "STAFF" Changes from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions: 2005 - 2009

Changes In Staff Levels ⁶ Staff levels declined along with revenues and expenditures between FY 2004-2005 and FY 2008-2009, reflecting the efforts by county government to adjust to the loss of SRS payments (see Table 13 for selected portions of total table). During this time period, full-time equivalencies (FTE) declined from 615 to 384, a 38 percent change.

- Sheriff
- District Attorney
- Juvenile Justice
- Adult Corrections
- Public Health
- Public Works

Sheriff ⁶ Reductions in staff level began as early as 2000 when the department had 118 FTE; in FY 2004-2005, there were 89 FTE compared to 79 FTE in FY 2008-2009, a decrease of 11 percent. While most of the units in the department have experienced declines in staffing, most notable are the patrol and jail units. The patrol unit decreased by 7 percent between FY 2004-2005 and FY 2008-2009, from 21 to 18 FTE, respectively. The adult jail staff has decreased by 18 percent, from 40 to 33 FTE, for the same time period.

**Table 13: Josephine County FTE:
FY 04-05 to FY 08-09**⁶

	04-05	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	% Chg
• Public Safety	140	139	146	142	121	-14%
• Sheriff	89	86	88	87	79	-11%
• D.A.	21	22	23	22	22	5%
• Juvenile Justice	30	31	35	33	31	3%

Different Sources

July 5, 2013 With the fiscal year that started on July 1, the Josephine County Sheriff’s Office now has exactly one deputy left available for general calls in a county of 83,000 people — down from a high of 22 at full staffing a few years ago.⁷

FY 2011 vs. Fy 2012 Rural patrol was technically from 22 to 3. The 3 contracted patrol deputies for the City of Cave Junction, rivers, and federal forests are not for private property rural patrol. Therefore, rural patrol for rural private property went from 19 personnel to 0 (zero).⁸

Br. IIIH.5.5.3 OSU'S RSP: JO CO "Service Level" Changes from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions: 2005 - 2009

Changes in Service Levels From Loss of FFP: Policy Decisions by JO CO: 2005 - 2009

Sheriff "s ability to be responsive to the community"s needs had been greatly diminished. Currently the patrol unit only operates one 12 hour shift from early evening through early morning, whereas in the past they had been able to provide 24 hour service.

- | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| • Sheriff | • Adult Corrections |
| • District Attorney | • Public Health |
| • Juvenile Justice | • Public Works |

Sheriff The dispatch center now operates using a triage approach, prioritizing calls into those that are life-threatening (priority one) and those that are imminent (priority two). All other calls (e.g. reports of theft) may not receive a response for hours or several days. The adult jail has a 262 bed capacity but is considered full when at 80 percent capacity, or 210 beds. In FY 2004-2005, the county had funding for 140 beds compared with 100 in FY 2008-2009. If the budget is reduced by 50 percent in FY 2009-2010, the number of beds would be reduced to 50, which could impact revenues from the state. The civil unit has become backlogged from an increase in orders making it difficult to turn work around within the specified time frame. Restraining or stalking orders may take more than the typical 24 or 48 hours to be served. Concealed weapons permits are taking up to 4 weeks to process instead of the typical 2 weeks. Currently there is no one to do intelligence research on drug cartels and gangs.

District Attorney – The LOS that the DA is able to provide is directly related to the changes taking place in the Sheriff"s office. With a reduction in law enforcement there are fewer cases ready for prosecution. This impacts the flow of cases to circuit courts and could, in return, impact funding for the county jail and community correction services. With limited funds, the DA will likely target resources on high-priority crimes and may decline to prosecute nonviolent property crimes, minor drug crimes, and misdemeanors. In addition, the loss of human capital, when more experienced attorneys leave and are placed with less experienced attorneys, has the potential to impact the flow of work.

Juvenile Justice – Although the department has taken cuts in their budget and personnel have taken on some additional responsibility, they have been relatively successful providing the same level of service to the county. Without the passage of the public safety tax districts, however, and with an expected 69 percent reduction in support from the General Fund for FY 2009-2010, the juvenile shelter would be eliminated to reduce costs, and the number of detention beds reduced to 2. Currently detention has the capacity to support 14 beds. The loss of an intake officer is going to reduce the amount of time that is spent on informal and diversion assessment with lower risk youth so that the focus can be on personal misdemeanors like assaults and felony offenses. The youth that would normally be detained while going through the court process would likely be released into the community. The loss of FTE in the court & field unit will reduce the number of probation officers in the field to two and the ability to provide service on on-site and on-school. With possible future funding from OYA, a treatment program could be provided instead of just hold for safety/security and for court, and the detention center could be saved.

Br. III.H.5.6 OSU'S RSP: Anticipated Impacts on JO CO and Possible Responses from Loss of FFP: after 2009

ANTICIPATED IMPACTS ON COMMUNITY AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES

Chapter 7. Anticipated Impacts on JO CO and Possible Responses: After 2009⁵

Ch. 7.a. Josephine County Impact Analysis Chapter 7 describes the results from interviews with businesses, institutions and county residents. Analysis of the data collected from interviews revealed that businesses/institutions and residents anticipate that reductions in services resulting from the loss of SRS funding may have very specific impacts on their well-being, and that these impacts may generate private responses that have financial and political implications. In many instances, these responses produce additional impacts and responses.

Impact To Well-Being Well-being includes emotional and physical factors that impact overall quality of life, such as concerns over financial security and way of life, or threats to personal or community safety.

Financial Impacts Financial impacts include those related to time, money and risk, as well as economic factors related to the social system of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of goods and services of the county.

Other Financial & Political Implications The reductions in staff levels and support for programs and services, in general, impact well-being in a number of ways, yet, also have financial and political implications. Among these are impacts to affiliate programs, impacts on private/non-profit organizations or volunteers; impacts on emotions of residents; impacts on quality of service, impacts on county employee morale, and impacts on economic development and recruitment opportunities.

JO CO Participants responded to questions about the reductions in Public Safety, Public Health, Road Department and Library staff and service levels. While responses varied based on personal experiences, common themes of impacts to well-being, financial impacts and political impacts emerged. In Josephine County, businesses expressed more concern over financial impacts, while institutions tended to be balanced between financial impacts and impacts on well-being, and residents expressed more concern over impacts on well-being, particularly issues of safety.

The larger OSU Rural Studies Program considered the following anticipated impacts.

- Impacts To Public Safety
- Impacts To Public Health
- Impacts To Public Works
- Impacts To Library
- Other Financial & Political Implications

The Exploratory Committee focused on well being and financial impacts and political implications.

Br. III.H.5.6.1 Impacts On Well Being From Reductions In Public Safety: 2009

Br. III.H.5.6.2 Impacts On Financial & Political Implications from Loss of FFP: 2009

Br. IIIH.5.6.1 OSU'S RSP: Impacts on Well Being from Reductions in Public Safety: After 2009

ANTICIPATED IMPACTS ON COMMUNITY AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES

Chapter 7. Anticipated Impacts on JO CO and Possible Responses From Loss of FFP: After 2009⁵

Ch. 7.a. Impacts To Well-Being From Reductions In Public Safety Well-being includes emotional and physical factors that impact overall quality of life, such as concerns over financial security and way of life, or threats to personal or community safety.

Reduced Capacity to Arrest Participants of businesses, institutions and residents expressed concern that the reduced capacity to arrest, hold and prosecute criminal offenders would result in an increase in the number of offenders in, or released into, the community, which would increase the chance that businesses or residents would become victims of crime, impacting well-being. It also increases the chance that offenders – those not apprehended, or prematurely released – would not receive the sanctions or treatment they need to make restitution, resulting in repeat offenses, which further impacts well-being.

Financial Impacts Participants identified several financial impacts associated with these scenarios. In the case of the first, for example, should harm come to an individual it may be necessary for them to seek out and bear the costs of medical care, or if there is property theft or damage there may be costs associated with replacement or repair. There are also potential impacts to insurance rates.

Response to Reduction In Public Safety When asked how they, or the community, might respond to reductions in public safety and potential increase in crime rates, participants indicated that some people will do nothing, including no longer calling into to report crimes while others will (and are) taking matters into their own hands – by acquiring a concealed weapon and/or permit, acquiring a dog for security/protection, installing and/or subscribing to an alarm system/service, or installing security windows, doors, gates or fencing.

“They don't see the safety people anyway - so they don't feel they're losing much, now.” – Josephine County business/institution

“They will take things into their own hands. They'll all be packing rifles. We already know people who are doing that. There are a lot of concealed weapons permits.” – Josephine County resident

Reduction in Patrol Participants felt that the reduction in patrol from a 24/7 schedule to one 10-hour shift would increase the chance that people traveling the county roads would become victims of an accident, either through their own actions or others, impacting well-being. For example, less caution may be used in observing speed limits or taking unnecessary risks, especially if it is common knowledge there is not adequate law enforcement.

Financial Implications Participants identified several financial implications that might arise from this situation. If an automobile accident occurred, for example, there would be expenses associated with a wrecked vehicle including increases in insurance rates, medical expenses related to an injury or injuries, or legal expenses incurred in defending wrongful actions.

Reduce Property Values Participants also noted that the reduction in public safety has the capacity to reduce property values, or impacts the ability to sell property due to increases in crime rates.

Economic Development Finally, participants noted that a reduction in public safety would have an impact on economic development and recruitment opportunities for the county. They felt that without a vibrant public safety system, business and individuals would be less willing to locate to the county or would move away.

Br. IIIH.5.6.2 OSU'S RSP: Impacts on Financial & Political Implications from Loss of FFP: After 2009

ANTICIPATED IMPACTS ON COMMUNITY AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES

Chapter 7. Anticipated Impacts on JO CO and Possible Responses: After 2009⁵

Ch. 7.a. Impacts on Financial & Political Implications from Loss of FFP: After 2009 The reductions in staff levels and support for programs and services, in general, impact well-being in a number of ways, yet, also have financial and political implications.

The reductions in staff levels and support for programs and services, in general, impact well-being in a number of ways, yet, also have financial and political implications. Among these are impacts to affiliate programs, impacts on private/non-profit organizations or volunteers; impacts on emotions of residents; impacts on quality of service, impacts on county employee morale, and impacts on economic development and recruitment opportunities.

The reduction of support for programs and services has had a financial impact as well as an impact on well-being of affiliate programs. The reduction in funding to a number of programs has also resulted in an increased demand and reliance for private/non-profit organization or volunteer assistance, shifting the financial responsibility of providing these services onto others within the community, which may not be proportionally shared by county residents.

Participants of both groups also noted that the actions taken by county government in past years have resulted in heightened feelings of frustration, resentment, anger, and apathy which affect individual and community well-being.

These emotions, in part, have led to behaviors and actions that have political consequences which, ultimately, translate into financial impacts and impacts on well-being. Some of these emotions stem from differences in political ideologies; however, there is also a perception that county management lacks professional managerial and administrative skills necessary to run a functional government. Some participants view the actions of management as divisive to the community and perceive a resistance to change, which has prevented productive discussion about comprehensive, long-term solutions.

This results in a lack of confidence and trust in government, which is mirrored in the lack of support for local bond levies or tax districts which perpetuates financial instability and results in less responsive government.

Within county government, employee morale has suffered resulting in emotional stress on remaining and new employees who struggle to cope with the loss of resources and the additional demands placed on them, and who feel the vulnerability of their positions. Well-being is negatively impacted.

The consequence of this – in combination with higher wages and stable situation offered in neighboring cities and counties – is the loss of experienced county employees.

The loss of seasoned employees, in turn, results in a loss of institutional knowledge and human capital (also known as “brain drain”). This translates into decreased quantity and quality of service and feeds into the cycle of declining employee morale. The loss of efficiency and effectiveness from the combined influence of all these factors ultimately has financial impacts on the functioning of county government and its ability to serve the people.

Finally, the current situation in general impacts economic development.

Br. IIIH.5.6.3 OSU’S RSP: Lack of Confidence and Trust in Government from Loss of FFP

Chapter 7. Anticipated Impacts on JO CO and Possible Responses: After 2009⁵

Ch. 7.a. Impacts on Financial & Political Implications from Loss of FFP: After 2009

Participants of businesses, institutions and residents noted that the actions taken by county government in past years have resulted in heightened feelings of frustration, resentment, anger, and apathy which affect individual and community well-being.

“There is a group that is angry and frustrated by [the closure of the libraries]. There have been letters to the editor written by people who have visited the community ... when they first stop it’s at the library, because a lot of times the library is the location where a lot of activities are happening in the community.” – Josephine County business/institution

“Each time they’ve done a levy it’s like a boy crying wolf. People have really come to resent that because in one way it comes off – it’s not a warning – it’s a threat. ‘If you don’t vote the money, this is going to happen to you’ ... we haven’t had a discussion about what the real services are, how much does it really cost for a guy in a car who’s trained and has tools respond to you ...” – Josephine County business/institution

We haven’t had a discussion about what the real services are, how much does it really cost?

“When people keep seeing a tax it becomes a mental way of doing things. You don’t expect anything good to happen because you keep seeing they’re ‘taking this away, they’re taking that away’; it becomes more of a negative attitude spiral within the community. And that adds into it. If you have a community you take pride in, you start making sure the shopping carts are picked up, you call animal control because you know the officers will respond. If you don’t expect anything from the county government you quit looking for the county government to supply services for you.” – Josephine County business/institution

These emotions, in part, have led to behaviors and actions that have political consequences which, ultimately, translate into financial impacts and impacts on well-being. Some of these emotions stem from differences in political ideologies; however, there is also a perception that county management lacks professional managerial and administrative skills necessary to run a functional government. Some participants view the actions of management as divisive to the community and perceive a resistance to change, which

Each time they’ve done a levy it’s like a boy crying wolf. People have really come to resent that because in one way it comes off – it’s not a warning – it’s a threat. If you don’t vote the money, this is going to happen to you.

has prevented productive discussion about comprehensive, long-term solutions.

“... ‘Oh, you can’t have someone running the county that isn’t elected’ ... [The county manager issue] is just a phony ‘wedge’ issue that has just kept deferring and putting off being able to really address economic and budget issues.” – Josephine County business/institution

This results in a lack of confidence and trust in government, which is mirrored in the lack of support for local bond levies or tax districts which perpetuates financial instability and results in less responsive government.

They’re not going to get funds if they don’t build trust ... I don’t think people are against paying taxes when they can understand it.

“They’re not going to get funds if they don’t build trust ... I don’t think people are against paying taxes when they can understand it.” – Josephine County resident

Br. IIIH.5.7 OSU'S RSP: Oregon State University Rural Study Program Conclusion

Chapter 8. Conclusion Of Analysis of Policy Impacts and Responses from Loss of Secure Rural School Funding in Selected Oregon Counties.³ The resource revenue sharing programs for counties with extensive tracts of federal land, combined with highly productive timber harvests through the 1980s, created dependence by county government and its citizens on the revenues it provided to fund county services, and have shaped the economies and local governments of rural Oregon. Counties with O&C lands within their borders became more dependent on these payments for general fund services, such as public safety, than those with NFS lands, who became more dependent on these payments for roads and schools.

Changes in federal forest management, enactment of environmental policies, recessions, and a shift to a global economy dramatically impacted counties between the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1990s, counties began experiencing a shift away from traditional natural resource extraction activities – amidst changing demographics resulting from rural restructuring taking place across the west by baby-boomers and amenity seekers – towards more service, recreation and tourism oriented economies.

Progressive population increases have escalated demand for county government services, while progressively declining populations have reduced county tax bases. At the same time, voter-initiated state tax measures fixed property tax rates and restricted annual increases in property tax assessments, reflecting anti-tax/anti-government sentiments. The federal government's attempt to stabilize payments to county governments perpetuated a continued reliance on these payments through the authorization of OBRA in 1993 and the subsequent authorization of SRS in 2000 and reauthorizations in 2007 and 2008, in spite of their impending expiration.

Taken together, all of these factors have influenced the actions Oregon county governments faced with the loss of SRS payments. However, federal forest and state property tax policies are the predominant structural constraints that influence county government decision making. Or – to quote the Association of Oregon Counties – together they have created “structural handcuffs” that have narrowed the choices available to county government, making it difficult for counties to raise additional revenues necessary to **maintain public service levels of the past**. The result has been dramatic cuts to staff and service levels in programs and departments, which vary by county.

Reductions in services may have very specific impacts on the well-being of **businesses, institutions and residents**, and these impacts may generate private responses that have financial and political implications.

In many instances, these responses may feed back to generate more impacts. Responses were consistent across all participant groups, and across all counties, although the degrees of concern for well-being, and financial and political impacts varied.

In general, businesses expressed more concern over financial impacts, while institutions tended to be balanced between financial impacts and impacts on well-being, and residents expressed more concern over impacts on well-being, particularly issues of safety. Business, institution and resident responses were also consistent with county government official perceptions for all three counties. The data revealed how difficult it is for participants to imagine possible impacts and their responses – either because they do not have enough experience or knowledge, or it has yet to impact them. The data also revealed the burdens are disproportionately placed on segments of the populations – especially those in remote parts of the county, or those without financial resources.

This research has examined how JO CO changed budgets and services in response to pending termination of the **Secure Rural Schools** funding. By looking at these changes through the eyes of both local officials and their constituents, it can assist federal, state and county decision makers in developing and choosing thoughtful policy alternatives, informed with the knowledge of the influences of past policies, collective action, their own world views.

2011. *Economic Impacts on Oregon of the Termination of Secure Rural Schools Payments to Counties: 2011 Update*

Weber, B., Lewin P., & Sorte B. November 2011. *Economic Impacts on Oregon of the Termination of Secure Rural Schools Payments to Counties: 2011 Update*. A Report of the “Changing Federal County Payments Policy and Rural Oregon Counties: Impacts and Options” Project. Corvallis, OR.

Funding for the original “Changing Federal County Payments Policy and Rural Oregon Counties: Impacts and Options” Project, which ended in 2009, was provided by the Association of Oregon Counties and The Ford Family Foundation, with encouragement from the Eastern Oregon Rural Alliance. The current update was supported by the Oregon Agricultural Experiment Station and the OSU Extension Service.

Introduction Over half the land in Oregon (53%) is owned by the Federal government. Many Oregon counties with substantial shares of their land in Federal forests have depended on shared revenues from Federal forestlands for significant portions of their county government revenues. Over the past several decades, a number of forces have converged to disrupt the historical patterns of funding for county government services in Oregon. New voter-initiated limitations on property taxes were put in place in the early 1990s as Federal government forest management practices and national policies constrained the timber harvest on Federal land and thus the harvest-based revenues that had been shared with county government. These changes introduced a considerable amount of uncertainty into county finance, and expiration in 2007 of legislation that authorized the Federal forest payments to counties seriously threatened the fiscal capacity of a majority of Oregon counties. Many county governments in Oregon entered fiscal year 2008-09 with the prospect of having to implement drastic cuts in services. Eight of the 36 counties faced cuts of more than 50 percent in their road funds, and 6 counties faced cuts of more than 30 percent in their general funds. (Association of Oregon Counties, 2008, p. 4)

Beginning in 1993 Congress attempted to counter the declines in payments to counties by restructuring the county payments policies. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 and then the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-393) (hereafter SRS) stabilized payments to counties and schools by providing payments to counties based on receipts during years with historically high harvest levels. The SRS provided payments to counties and schools in 42 states. In Oregon, the SRS payments went to 33 of 36 counties. Most funding to counties tied to Forest Service lands must be used on county roads and schools (with a specified share being passed through directly to schools), while funding tied to Bureau of Land Management lands can be used for general purposes. Title I of the Act (providing 80% to 85% of total payments) funded a general safety net for county services and schools. Title III funded search and rescue and fire protection and other county services related to Federal forest lands. Title II expenditures, guided by local Resource Advisory Committees, supported projects aimed at restoration of public lands and nearby private lands. In the analysis that follows, only Title I and Title III payments are considered “discretionary” county funds since Title II funds remain in Federal accounts.

The original SRS act expired in September 2006 and a one-year extension of the SRS expired in September 2007. This meant that final payments would have been received during the 2007-08 county fiscal year ending June 30, 2008. Despite efforts by the Oregon Congressional delegation and others, counties entered the 2008-09 county fiscal year without SRS funds. In October 2008, Congress reauthorized the SRS act as part of P.L. 110-343. This reauthorization, which continued and phased down payments, expired in 2011. Counties are receiving final SRS payments in the current fiscal year (ending June 30, 2012). This report provides estimates of the economic impact of the termination of SRS payments. There are many different ways that economic impacts of the termination of the SRS payments could be analyzed. One could, for example, estimate the difference between the final SRS payments that counties are receiving during the current fiscal year (FY 2011-12) and the payments they would receive under historical timber harvest revenue sharing formulas next year (FY 2012-13). The final payments for FY 2011-12 are significantly lower than the original level of payments established in P.L. 106-393. As stipulated in P.L. 110-343, FY 2011-12 payments are less than half of the levels established in the original bill (which pegged the SRS payments to levels received in the years with historically high timber harvests). Using SRS payments for FY

2011-12 would therefore not capture the full effect of the termination of the SRS program on Oregon counties or the state. Our analysis in this paper provides estimates of the impact on the Oregon economy of Oregon county governments not receiving in FY 2012-13 the level of Secure Rural Schools funding they received in the 2007-08 fiscal year. It shows the effects of this loss on employment, output, and value added in the Oregon economy.

Table 1 shows the difference between (1) SRS payments received by counties in FY 2007-08 and (2) county receipts expected from federal timber harvests in 2013 if the SRS payments are terminated. This difference is the amount that counties will have to raise in 2013 if there is no extension of payments in order to reach the level of federal funding they would have gotten under the original P.L. 106-393 formula. If SRS payments are terminated, counties would still receive shared revenue from timber harvests from federal USFS and BLM land. The next-to-last row of Table 1 presents estimates of the harvest-based payments that the counties would continue to receive under the original revenue sharing formulas, assuming that USFS Oregon harvest receipts remain at the average of the last seven years (FY 2004-2010) and the harvest values removed from O&C lands remain at the FY 2010 level.

Table 1: Difference between 2007-08 SRS Payments to Counties and Expected County Shared Federal Timber Harvest Receipts in 20131

2. Oregon Governor Kulongoski's Task Force & Subcommittee

2009. Governor's Task Force On Federal Forest Payments And County Services

Oregon Governor's Task Force. Final Report January 2009. *Governor's Task Force On Federal Forest Payments And County Services*. Governor Theodore R. Kulongoski. 148 pages. Salem, OR.

Br. IIIH.6.1 OR Governor's Task Force (OGTF) Findings: Impacts of No Action Alternative (1 of 3)

OGTF Findings Summary: 2009³ The following information applicable to the JS&PSS issue is from the Section 13 Summary of Findings, of the *Governor's Task Force On Federal Forest Payments And County Services* 2009 document (see full report).³ There are three educational brochures addressing this topic.

Oregon Governor's Task Force 2009 Section 13 Summary of Findings

- o Oregon's rural counties and school districts will face a net loss of \$243 million in annual federal safety net payments for federal forest lands as payments under the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS) phase out over the next four fiscal years.
- o These effects of the phase-out of SRS payments will create fiscal crises for 24 hard hit counties as early as the spring of 2011, when they must prepare for the loss of more than half of their current payments in the 2011-12 fiscal year and the cessation of those payments in 2012-13.
- o **This will be the first time that many of Oregon's federal forest counties will be forced to fend for themselves** since harvests from federal lands were curtailed in the early 1990s and federal safety net payments related to the spotted owl began in Western Oregon counties in 1994.
- o Schools' share of the safety net payments in Oregon amounts to \$32.9 million, or approximately \$60 for every child in the K-12 system. This is enough money to pay for two days of the school year in every school district in the state.
- o Counties will bear the brunt of the revenue losses if SRS payments cease. In 24 hard hit counties, proportionate revenue losses will exceed those suffered by the state during the 2001-03 recession.
- o The eventual loss of SRS payments will produce unavoidable and dire consequences. **Six county governments may be unable to meet the most elemental needs of public health and safety** within a year or two after these payments terminate. Lane County, the fourth most populous county in Oregon, is among them. Another two counties could fail within the following two to four years.
- o The effects of such a loss of revenue would **compromise basic health and safety and local transportation systems** in a majority of Oregon counties and set back economic development not only in rural Oregon but throughout the state.
- o **At the county level, there are only two options available** to deal with the near-term loss of SRS payments:
 - cut county budgets and services; or,
 - increase county revenues from county taxpayers.
- o **Most of the hard hit counties have already cut their budgets to bare-bones levels.** Increasing county revenues from county taxpayers is their only remaining option at the local level. But their ability to do so is limited under state law. Property taxes are the mainstay of county services; these taxes are capped under the state constitution and can be raised, only temporarily, by a vote of the people. Many of the affected counties have low property tax rates and unused "tax capacity" that, on paper, could allow temporary tax increases of 100 percent or more within the constitutional limits. But it is difficult – and unprecedented -- to expect a county to impose and absorb tax increases of 100 percent in a short period of time.

Br. IIIH.6.2 OR OGTF Findings: Impacts of No Action Alternative (2 of 3)

OREGON GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE 2009 SECTION 13 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The OGTF concludes that increased property tax revenues of 10 percent to 30 percent, which would require overall increases of two percent to five percent for local taxpayers, are more feasible as a short-term expectation, based on the success of property tax levies approved by county voters in recent years. Increases of this magnitude would recover between eight percent and 24 percent of the hard hit counties' revenue shortfall.

o Assistance from state government and state taxpayers could come in many forms, beginning with the following.

- increases in shared financing for shared services
- new or increased general revenue sharing

Both approaches are limited by the constraints of the state budget (which is facing a severe fiscal crisis in the midst of a global recession) and demands to address unmet needs (such as expanding health coverage to all children).

We scoured the state budget to identify opportunities for shared financing, both for the federal forest counties and for counties generally.

We came up with a total of 35 recommendations in the areas of law enforcement, criminal prosecution, public health, juvenile services etc.

o Counties cannot grow their way out of these problems in the short term, but the state can provide targeted economic assistance to sustain infrastructure and provide some funds to leverage development opportunities.

o We conclude that the best efforts of Oregon counties, state government and local and state taxpayers are not likely to recover more than 40 percent of the revenue shortfall that the hard hit counties will suffer from the loss of SRS payments.

o There are promising proposals for assistance from the federal government. These include: increased shares of harvest receipts for federal forest counties and continuation of payments for forest management and services related to federal land, and federal resources that will benefit all counties. These proposals are important and should be pursued. But they are unlikely to make up more than 14 percent of the SRS revenue loss.

Br. IIIH.6.3 OR OGTF Findings: Impacts of No Action Alternative (3 of 3)

Oregon Governor's Task Force 2009 Section 13 Summary of Findings

Ironically, this is a time when longer term solutions to the SRS payments crisis are beginning to take shape. More productive management of federal forests could provide new revenues for counties and a shot in the arm for local economies beginning four years from now. We estimate that revenues from more productive management of these lands could be significant – representing sixteen percent of the hard hit counties' expected revenue losses from doubling harvest levels to more than half of their revenue losses when combined with even greater harvest levels and increased shares of harvest receipts.

The Western Oregon Plan Revisions undertaken by the BLM, although now subject to objections from the Governor and legal challenges from both timber interests and environmental groups, underscores the need for a long overdue change in the management of federal forest lands. If this process fails, we recommend the state should consider taking over management of the O&C lands in Western Oregon. However we get there, we need better management of federal forests that promote forest health and balance sustainable forestry with protection of our environment.

Longer term, the possibility of new rewards for healthy forests by means of cap-and-trade or other compensation schemes to combat global warming could provide a new and sustainable model for the management of federal forests and the sharing of federal revenues with rural counties.

The best case scenario for transitioning Oregon counties from the current system of federal safety net payments and establishing a self-sustaining system of federal forest management and revenue sharing will require four years. Planning for the four-year phase-out should begin immediately and should involve both the hard hit counties and state government.

The Path to this New System

1. increased local tax effort by county taxpayers to **sustain county services**.
2. increased support from state taxpayers for state-county services and targeted assistance to county governments to **sustain essential services** and boost economic development in rural counties.
3. more revenue sharing by the federal government.
4. the implementation of sustainable management and harvesting regimes for federal forest lands.

No one of these approaches will be sufficient by itself to restore economic sustainability for our federal forests and fiscal viability for the hardest hit counties.

Longer term, there is great potential in securing compensation for the value of maintaining healthy forests to combat global warming.

o Oregon, unlike many other states, has no provisions in state law to deal with bankruptcies or fiscal failures by local governments. This finding has convinced us to investigate legislation that authorizes the use of financial control boards to administer local governments in fiscal distress and to establish provisions to identify and avert public safety emergencies.

2010. Report of the Reset Subcommittee On Public Safety

Oregon Governor's Reset Cabinet. June 2010. *Report of the Reset Subcommittee On Public Safety*. Salem, OR.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The key objective of the Reset Cabinet is to “develop a plan containing specific recommendations to the Governor to reset State government’s core functions and stabilize its revenue structure.” We have developed options at a time when, according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting indexes, Oregon’s person and property crimes are at historic lows, prison capacity has grown to its highest level, and the cost of operating the prison system has increased dramatically over the last fifteen years.

The Public Safety subcommittee has addressed the expected \$2.5 billion shortfall in the 2011-13 biennial state budget by focusing primarily on the most expensive element of the state’s public safety system – prisons. During the next decade, when the shortfall between revenue and expenses is expected to remain at more than \$2 billion if nothing is done, the April 2010 Department of Corrections prison forecast predicts 2,000 additional prison beds will be necessary to carry out our current sentencing policies – pushing the prison population to 16,000 by 2020.

There are three main cost drivers in building and operating prisons. Our efforts focused on two: who is entering the prison system and how long they stay. (The third cost driver – the pay and benefits of public safety workers – will be addressed in the main Reset Cabinet report.³)

The subcommittee options will impact those two cost drivers by looking with a cost/benefit eye at what gives taxpayers the greatest return on their public safety investment and continues to protect communities and reduce future crime victimization.

Because the budget savings from some of the options presented will take several years to realize, we provide both short-term and long-term steps to optimize the use of our most expensive public safety resource, state prison beds. These options require weighing difficult trade offs in how to reduce budgets and must be driven by evidence based practices and the experience of other states.

None of these options are easily achieved, but we believe these options represent a viable opportunity for the State to emerge from its financial crisis with a well balanced and efficient system that prioritizes the public’s safety. In concert with other options, these reductions will provide some budgetary protection for key programs in education and health and human services systems – including mental health and alcohol and drug treatment that directly impact crime and incarceration rates. These systems are essential areas of investment to break cycles of criminality and reduce crime long term.

Both the Reset Cabinet and the Subcommittee were asked to put traditional thinking and structures aside and develop options that could be used as new, more economical models of service delivery. This request proved to be a challenge. But the Subcommittee has identified options that meet this test and bear further consideration.

These options include modifications in the relationship between the state and counties and the current cost structures for public safety funding. The Subcommittee looked for options that would provide models for incentives to form new partnerships with counties to encourage district attorneys to adopt uniform charging and sentencing practices. Also, the subcommittee suggests that counties use local cost effective, accountability measures to deal with short term, non-violent offenders who will be shortly returning to their communities. These policies, if implemented, would make more effective use of the expensive prison bed resource. Given the expected loss of federal timber revenue in several counties, these partnerships are critical to maintaining an acceptable level of county services.

The subcommittee during the course of its work produced a survey instrument to gauge the reaction of various stakeholders to the acceptance of the problem statement set forth by the Governor in the executive order, and to determine whether there were potential solutions or options around which public safety stakeholders could coalesce. A brief summary of the survey results are provided later in this report and the full results are available at <http://cjinstitute.org/projects/oregonreset>. In addition, the subcommittee spent time discussing both the challenges

and options for solutions with many stakeholder and partner groups including sheriffs, chiefs of police, district attorneys, victims advocates from the Attorney General's office, community corrections leaders, leadership from the Oregon Youth Authority, Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, the Judicial Department and others.

Because sentencing policy, not crime rates, drives the use of expensive prison beds, the subcommittee believes a restructuring of sentencing policy to a modern, uniform sentencing guideline system based upon truth in sentencing will provide fair, transparent allocation of prison time to those offenders posing the greatest long term threat to our communities. These guidelines must:

- Take advantage of the more than 9,000 prison beds that have been added to system since the old guideline system was created in 1989
- Keep faith with the spirit of the statutory sentencing changes that have been implemented by the Legislature and citizens since those guidelines were created
- Acknowledge the scarcity of resources in this environment, an issue that is too often ignored when sentencing policies are established.

Finally, at the recommendation of many in the public safety community, the subcommittee has proposed that the State adopt federal earned-time guidelines including 15 percent earned time for all offenders that are not incarcerated for life, and greater use of transitional resources such as halfway houses and electronic monitoring at the end of their sentences.

Many of the options presented in this report, if implemented, would take more than a single biennium to achieve their desired result. In some cases it may be five or more years before the financial impacts of these policy choices will be reflected in the State budget. Yet the material addressed later in this report demonstrates that the cumulative effect of these changes, if enacted and adhered to over time, can result in potentially hundreds of millions of dollars in avoided costs and system savings.

The short-term budget challenge is, however, more daunting. While politically difficult to address, the Subcommittee believes the biggest short-term savings would come from a further legislative delay in the implementation of sentence enhancements contained in Ballot Measure 57, dealing with repeat property offenders. Property crime rates are at historic lows in Oregon, and a decision to delay the measure's implementation would result in estimated savings of almost \$40 million in the 2011-2013 biennium alone.

Virtually all of these options would require legislative action. The key sentencing guidelines measure, however, will require a bi-partisan legislative effort with a 2/3 approval or a citizen referral and vote in May, 2011. The incoming Governor and Legislature must understand the gravity of the State's financial situation and seriously consider their role in crafting a long term stable public safety system against the backdrop of our current and projected financial picture.

The alternatives are much worse. If Oregonians fail to plan for our public safety system's future with an honest assessment of the financial situation, the State will not avoid the problem. The State will still have to deal with less money, but rather than using long term, careful planning to assure our ability to carry out the sentences that are imposed, the State will be forced to consider the early release of offenders who have already been sentenced and will risk the same overcrowding of inmates that brought federal litigation in Oregon in the 1980's. Rather than the temporary policy that bridges the State to sustainable corrections practices, these early releases and prison overcrowding will become the norm.

In addition, the State risks disproportionate reductions in certain segments of the public safety system that create dangerous imbalances in the system as a whole. Cuts, for example to courts and indigent defense, have the effect of shutting down the criminal justice system. These actions erode the principle of "swift and certain" sanctions and destroy accountability as certain crimes are essentially ignored. Likewise, limiting resources for law enforcement, prosecutors, and community corrections can create an unbalanced system.

In short, if we fail to plan for a changed economic future, we plan to fail as a public safety system.

3. Oregon Criminal Justice Commission

- Br. III.E.1.6.3 Oregon Criminal Justice Commission
- Br. III.E.1.6.3.1 OR Criminal Justice Commission & 2009 OR Governor's Reset Cabinet
- Br. III.E.1.6.3.2 OR Criminal Justice Commission's Public Safety Subcommittee Report
- Br. III.E.1.6.3.3 OR Criminal Justice Commission's & OR Senate Bill 77

Br. III.E.1.6.3 Oregon Criminal Justice Commission

CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION http://www.oregon.gov/CJC/Pages/about_us.aspx

The Criminal Justice Commission's purpose is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of state and local criminal justice systems by providing a centralized and impartial forum for statewide policy development and planning. The commission is charged with developing a long-range public safety plan for Oregon, which includes making recommendations on the capacity and use of state prisons and local jails, implementation of community corrections programs and methods to reduce future criminal conduct. In addition, the Commission has a role in funding and evaluating Oregon's drug courts. The commission also conducts research, develops impact estimates of crime-related legislation, acts as a statistical and data clearinghouse, administers Oregon's felony sentencing guidelines and provides staff to the advisory committees regarding asset forfeiture and racial profiling. Commission members are appointed to four-year terms by the governor and confirmed by the senate.

Justice System Exploratory Committee Research The Justice System Exploratory Committee, Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society, researched the Criminal Justice Commission's web site and could not find any information on the history of CJC's authority for "*minimally adequate level of public safety services.*" It is assumed there is no reference on the CJC's web site to "minimally adequate level of public safety services" because in 2012 the Oregon Legislature gave this authority to the Oregon Governor.

CJC's Authority Repealed³ Under former ORS 203.095 (2009) (SB 77 (2009)) CJC adopted rules (OAR 213-070-000 (2011)) pertaining to public safety services guidelines to aid CJC in determining whether a county provided a minimally adequate level of public safety services in certain defined areas. In 2012, the Oregon Legislature amended ORS 203.095 to remove CJC's authority in this regard, and to give the Governor authority, in certain circumstances, to determine whether a county is providing a minimally adequate level of state required services. HB 4176 (2012). As a result, CJC repealed its rules (OAR 213-070-000 (2011)) pertaining to determination of a minimally adequate level of public safety services.

Oregon Governor's Responsibility Under House Bill 3453³ The bill provides that the Governor of Oregon may proclaim public safety fiscal emergency for one or more counties where fiscal conditions compromise county ability to provide "*minimally adequate level of public safety services.*" Under 3453 the Governor could enter into agreements with local county commissioners to raise money for additional law enforcement services. Half of the money would come from state coffers and the other half would be in the form of higher local taxes.

Research to Continue Although the CJC no longer has responsibility, it provided an invaluable service in addressing the standards and criteria to determine "*minimally adequate level of public safety services*" that will continue to be researched. It premise follows.

There are substantial differences between counties in terms of, among other things, their geographic and demographic characteristics, historic crime rates and their willingness to tolerate certain levels of crime and their past and present funding of various public safety services. Given these, and other, substantial differences, writing rules for how to determine whether a particular county is providing "minimally adequate public safety services" is a difficult task. What services should be taken into account, what are the key data elements in measuring a particular public safety service and how should they be measured?

Br. III.E.1.6.3.1 OR Criminal Justice Commission & 2009 OR Governor's Reset Cabinet

CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION http://www.oregon.gov/CJC/Pages/about_us.aspx

Oregon Criminal Justice Commission Administrative (OCJC) Overview: 2010³ In January 2004 Governor Ted Kulongoski asked the **CJC to oversee a comprehensive review of the state's public safety system**, and created several task forces (Adult Sentencing, Criminal Justice Systems, Elder Abuse, and Methamphetamine) and a Juvenile Justice Summit to address topical issues. A Public Safety Review Steering Committee was created to coordinate and review the work, and to submit final recommendations to Governor Kulongoski.³⁻⁴

OR Governor's Reset Cabinet: 2009 In September 2009 Governor Kulongoski established the seven member **Governor's Reset Cabinet to develop options for "resetting" state government in order to preserve and improve the critical services it provides to Oregonians** (EO 09-13). Addressing the expected **\$2.5 billion shortfall** in the 2011 biennial state budget, and the **anticipated increase in demand for prison space**, the Reset Cabinet's Public Safety Subcommittee, with CJC membership and Reset Cabinet member DOC director as chair, made a number of recommendations, including restructuring sentencing policy to a uniform sentencing guideline system focusing on offenders posing the greatest long term threat to communities; adopting federal earned time guidelines for all offenders not incarcerated for life; and increasing the use of transitional resources such as halfway houses and electronic monitoring at the end of sentences.³⁻⁴

OCJC Public Safety Subcommittee The Governors Reset Cabinet adopted the Public Safety Subcommittee's proposals, and added recommendations that legislators selectively adjust Measure 11 sentences to provide sufficient protection for the public; continue the temporary suspension of Measure 57 implementation; enhance the effectiveness of community corrections agencies in reducing recidivism; and incentivizing uniformity in local charging, sentencing and offender management.³⁻⁴

OR House Bill (HB) 3508 Faced with a budget shortfall, legislators passed HB 3508 in 2009 to "phase in" implementation of Measure 57, and increase the maximum possible time reduction for good behavior (earned time credits) from 20 to 30 percent. District attorneys were directed to identify offenders eligible for sentencing under Measure 57, and to provide these and other statistics to the CJC, which was requested to conduct a study on the impact of the measure and HB 3508 on recidivism (O.L. 2009, Ch. 660). In 2010 access to the increased earned time was restricted (O.L. 2010 SS, Ch. 2).³⁻⁴

The CJC was authorized in 2009 to apply for and receive gifts and grants from any public or private source, and to award grants from funds appropriated by the Legislative Assembly or any other source to further its statutory duties as a commission (O.L. 2009, Ch. 308). The AFOAC was reduced in size in this legislative session from 12 to 10 members (O.L. 2009, Ch. 506).³⁻⁴

OCJC Summer 2010 Newsletter⁵ The OCJC newsletter has a more human way of expressing the issue tasked to the Oregon Governor's Reset Cabinet. For example, *"It's not denial. I'm just selective about the reality I accept."* This quote from Bill Watterson, creator of the "Calvin and Hobbes" comic strip, resonates with the human capacity for denial about a reality we do not want to face.

Br. III.E.1.6.3.2 OR Criminal Justice Commission's Public Safety Subcommittee Report

OCJC Summer 2010 Newsletter³ **"It's not denial. I'm just selective about the reality I accept."** This quote from Bill Watterson, creator of the "Calvin and Hobbes" comic strip, resonates with the human capacity for denial about a reality we do not want to face. **A 2.5 Billion dollar reduction in funds to provide for education, human services, and a statewide public system in Oregon is a reality I would rather not accept. I would rather selectively focus on the fact that Oregonians are safer today, less likely to be a victim of violent crime or property crime, than they have been since the 60s. I would rather hope we can "do nothing" and ask the legislature to make cuts elsewhere and not touch spending on public safety.**

But I realize that **hoping we can get through this by "doing nothing" to reduce the cost of our system is a form of denial:** it fails to acknowledge the criminal justice system will get a hard look from the legislature in light of the magnitude of these reductions. To fail to plan for reduced budgets for public safety would be a form of denial in this environment.

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Governor Kulongoski asked his Reset Committee to **move from denial to planning for a "decade of deficits" if we make no changes.** During that time, Oregon will require 2,000 additional prison beds to carry out the sentencing policies we have put in place over the last 20 years. Adding that many beds in light of the magnitude of the budget cuts seems like an impossibility.

But I realize that **hoping we can get through this by "doing nothing" to reduce the cost of our system is a form of denial:** it fails to acknowledge the criminal justice system will get a hard look from the legislature in light of the magnitude of these reductions. To fail to plan for reduced budgets for public safety would be a form of denial in this environment.

Governor Kulongoski asked his Reset Committee to **move from denial to planning for a "decade of deficits" if we make no changes.** During that time, Oregon will require 2,000 additional prison beds to carry out the sentencing policies we have put in place over the last 20 years. Adding that many beds in light of the magnitude of the budget cuts seems like an impossibility.

How would we add 2,000 beds while subtracting hundreds of millions of dollars from the public safety budget? Whether you think adding those beds is a good or bad idea in this budget season becomes moot: **it looks like a financial impossibility.**

All of us are committed to public safety. None of us want to make cuts to the system that has been in place while crime in Oregon has dropped to historically low levels.

All of us are committed to public safety. None of us want to make cuts to the system that has been in place while crime in Oregon has dropped to historically low levels, but I am glad Governor Kulongoski asked his Reset Cabinet to **accept the reality of fewer resources and plan for the future.** If we plan wisely and face reality, Oregon will continue to enjoy safe communities. The public safety subcommittee report to Governor Kulongoski's Reset Cabinet, which accompanies this newsletter, lays out the reality and provides options for a new legislature and new Governor to consider in planning for Oregon's future.

Br. III.E.1.6.3.3 OR Criminal Justice Commission's & OR Senate Bill 77

OCJC Summer 2010 Newsletter³ Chair's Column – Judge Darryl Larson It may be summer but the OCJC is definitely not on vacation. One of the most difficult jobs being undertaken by the OCJC is how to adequately, fairly and successfully accomplish the task put before it by the Legislature in the form of **Senate Bill (SB) 77 concerning county public safety “emergencies.”**

There is a justifiable and very real concern that after 2012, the U.S. Congress may no longer authorize funding of what used to be called the O&C timber payments but are now commonly known as the Safe and Secure Rural Schools (SSR) funds. Twenty four of Oregon's 36 counties receive some of this funding. However, **some counties are particularly at risk from a cessation of the SSR funding.**

These counties suffer from a multiplier effect of structural features which could negatively affect public safety in these counties if that funding ends: (1) they have substantial percentages of their general funds dependent on the SSR funds (40-70%), (2) most of their general funds are dedicated to public safety, (3) they have relatively low property tax rates and/or receive a small percentage of the property taxes levied in that county with little legal room, or political opportunity, to increase those rates, and (4) substantial fractions of these counties are federally owned, not subject to taxation.

What services should be taken into account, what are the key data elements in measuring a particular public safety service and how should they be measured?

The last Legislature, concerned about the looming potential loss of SSR funding, enacted SB 77 relating to the declaration of a “public safety services emergency.” **In the face of such a declaration, the OCJC would be required to “review and analyze public safety services provided by the county” to determine whether the county is providing a “minimally adequate level of public safety services.”** There are substantial differences between counties in terms of, among other things, their geographic and demographic characteristics, historic crime rates and their willingness to tolerate certain levels of crime and their past and present funding of various public safety services. Given these, and other, substantial differences, writing rules for how to determine whether a particular county is providing “minimally adequate public safety services” is a difficult task indeed. **A committee of the OCJC is currently at work developing both a conceptual framework as well as draft rules to comply with the legislative directives laid out in SB 77.** The OCJC hopes to finalize the initial draft rule by the end of July, 2010.

OAR 213-070-000 [2013 Note: The OCJC was successful and OAR 213-070-000 was finalized in 2011]. You are invited and encouraged to participate in this effort by making recommendations to the CJC concerning our efforts to write the rules for determining “minimally adequate” public safety services in an affected county. **What services should be taken into account, what are the key data elements in measuring a particular public safety service and how should they be measured?** The current thought is that the rules should be such that, given the variability in counties, these rules must be flexible in application while being based on uniformity in the categories and data categories utilized for any given public safety service. We look forward to your input.

2010. Executive Director's Column (Oregon Criminal Justice Commission)

Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. Summer 2010. Executive Director's Column – Craig Prins. OCJC Summer 2010 Newsletter. Salem, OR.

2010. Oregon Criminal Justice Commission Administrative Overview

Oregon Secretary of State. November 2010. *Oregon Criminal Justice Commission Administrative Overview*. Salem, OR.

4. Association of Oregon Counties

2010. *Task Force on Effective and Cost-Efficient Service Provision*

Association of Oregon Counties. October 1, 2010. *Task Force on Effective and Cost-Efficient Service Provision*. Rep. Nancy Nathanson, Chair.

During the 2009 legislative session, HB 2920 passed with bipartisan support creating the Task Force on Effective and Cost-Efficient Service Provision. The Task Force has been charged with reviewing state and county shared services with the objective of considering opportunities to restructure government programs to be more effective and cost-efficient.

Report of the Task Force HB 2920 passed with bipartisan support creating the Task Force on Effective and Cost-Efficient Service Provision. The Task Force has been charged with reviewing state and county shared services with the objective of considering opportunities to restructure government programs to be more effective and cost-efficient. The four shared services areas to be reviewed are:

1. Assessment and Taxation
2. Criminal Justice
3. Elections
4. Human Services

In addition, the Task Force was charged with encouraging effective fiscal planning for counties managing the phase-out of federal forest safety net payments and recommending appropriate levels of state funding. The state of Oregon and her counties have a closely integrated system of service delivery for the residents of Oregon. Many state programs are delivered by counties, where the needs of local communities can best be served. This service delivery system has served Oregonians well for many years. This chart demonstrates the interconnected nature of state/county services.

Background The state of Oregon and her counties have a closely integrated system of service delivery for the residents of Oregon. Many state programs are delivered by counties, where the needs of local communities can best be served. This service delivery system has served Oregonians well for many years. This chart demonstrates the interconnected nature of state/county services.

Report of the Task Force This shared State-County Services Chart illustrates services in five broad areas:

1. Health & Human Services (18 services): such as child protection, aging and senior services and solid waste management.
2. Public Safety (20 services): such as state police, 9-1-1 communications and animal control.
3. Natural Resources & Recreation (14 services): such as wildlife regulation, noxious weed control and soil & water conservation.
4. Transportation, Land Use, and Economic Development (14 services): such as state highways, building permits and inspection and surveying.
5. Other community services (18 services): such as assessment and taxation, elections and recording public documents.

Of these 79 separate services, 14 are provided by the state, 19 by counties and 46 are state and county shared services.

The report from the Governor's Task Force on Federal Forest Payments and County Services (January 2009) highlighted the precarious financial situation Oregon faces with the pending loss of federal forest payments. Conditions are such that the health of the state/county shared services system is in danger of collapse in some service areas. Unfortunately, this precarious situation is now exacerbated by the extremely difficult budget condition the state is experiencing.

Delivery of services is not meeting demand. The population of Oregon has grown increasingly urban. Transportation and communication have evolved, increasing service delivery options. And, some of our economic base has shifted from agriculture and manufacturing to a service economy. The underlying government structure, however, has remained largely unchanged.

The state and counties strive for effective and efficient delivery of service, but never has there been a time when the need for efficiencies was greater.

Results The Task Force is presenting a total of 23 recommendations – five from the full Task Force and 18 from the subcommittees. There are a number of ways in which these recommendations will move forward, including:

- 14 recommendations are being drafted into legislative proposals
- Work groups will be created to continue work with two recommendations
- The Task Force will raise the issues with legislative leadership and/or state agencies with three recommendations
- The Task Force will encourage regional and partnership opportunities with one recommendation
- The Task Force will encourage state agency collaboration with one recommendation
- The Task Force will encourage ongoing efforts with two recommendations

5. Oregon Secretary of State

2012. *Oregon's Counties: 2012 Financial Condition Review*

Oregon Secretary of State. May 2012. *Oregon's Counties: 2012 Financial Condition Review*. Report Number 2012-17, Secretary of State Audit Report Kate Brown, Secretary of State Gary Blackmer, Director, Audits Division. Salem, OR.

Br. IIIH.4.1 OR Sec. of State Financial Condition Review of OR Counties: 2012

Br. IIIH.4.2 OR COs: 2012 Review of Fiscal Indicators (FI) 1 Local Support & 2 Timber Payment Dependence

Br. IIIH.4.3 OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 3 Debt Burden & 4 Liquidity

Br. IIIH.4.4 OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 5 Fund Balance & 6 Retirement Benefit Obligation

Br. IIIH.4.5 OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 7 Public Safety & 8 Personal Income

Br. IIIH.4.6 OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 9 Population Trends & 10 Unemployment

Br. IIIH.4.7 JO CO: 2012 Financial Condition Review

Br. IIIH.4.1 OR Sec. of State Financial Condition Review of OR Counties: 2012

Financial Condition Review In May 2012 the OR Secretary of State published an analysis entitled, "*Oregon's Counties: 2012 Financial Condition Review*."³

The objective of the 2012 report was to analyze the financial condition of county governments within the State of Oregon, and to **identify general strategies of other states for addressing financial concerns**. We also looked specifically at the federal timber payments to counties, which are scheduled to end, to identify the added financial strain.

Financial and Demographic Indicators & Bankruptcy The ability to evaluate the financial condition of a local government, whether by key decision makers within the government, taxpayers, rating agencies, bondholders or other parties, is critically important in today's economic environment.

Cities and counties around the country with long-term problems have found themselves pushed over the edge by the recession and its lingering aftermath. In Alabama, Jefferson County filed the largest Chapter 9 bankruptcy in American history. Officials in Michigan are negotiating the amount of aid, and subsequent oversight and control that could be provided to the City of Detroit. The City of Stockton, California is currently in negotiations in an attempt to avoid becoming the largest American city to declare bankruptcy.

Counties in Oregon are not immune to these and similar financial troubles. Public attention has been directed to counties including Curry, Josephine, and Lane, which are reported as facing financial hardship. Revenues from local sources such as property taxes and interest income as well as intergovernmental revenues from state and federal agencies have declined since 2008. Oregon, more than some other states, is further impacted by the anticipated loss of federal timber payments.

Approaches in Other States to Financial Monitoring and Intervention Other states have recognized the need to monitor the financial condition of local governments and, on occasion, intervene. State monitoring of financial indicators is one of the most common practices, though we found **no agreement on the indicators to use**. Some indicators attempt to predict financial distress to trigger early preventive efforts, while others are signals for dire conditions, when state intervention is needed. States face the challenge of defining their level of involvement in local government finances. We identified three broad approaches that states take in response to local governments in financial crises. Various combinations of the three approaches exist among the states. Research shows that the most effective states include monitoring and prevention as part of a comprehensive approach.

Approach No 1. Monitoring
Approach No 2. Proactive
Approach No 3. Intervention
 Preventive Intervention
 Reactive Intervention

Oregon's Approach to Financial Monitoring and Intervention Until recently, Oregon had very few laws associated with local government financial condition. **During the 2012 session, Oregon enacted laws to address financial distress among its counties;** the legislation (House Bills 4175, 4176, and 4177) is designed to assist troubled counties that were impacted by the recent loss of federal timber revenue. The most relevant of the three laws is House Bill 4176. The purpose of this law is to provide assistance to counties that had received federal timber payments through the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRS) and are now facing financial crisis. Under HB 4176, counties whose SRS payments exceeded 10% of their property tax revenue qualify to declare distress and seek state assistance and intervention.

If assistance is requested, the law allows for the establishment of a fiscal assistance board with the power to, among other things, reallocate funds, cut services, lay off employees, reduce expenditures, sell or lease real or personal county property, issue bonds, and renegotiate debt repayment. However, implementation of the board's actions require a majority vote of the governor appointed board members and a majority vote of the county's governing board.

Unfortunately, counties that do not qualify under the new law have few remedies at the state level. **While Oregon does allow Irrigation and Drainage Districts to file bankruptcy, it currently does not allow counties to file for bankruptcy.**

OR House Bill 2924 - Died In Committee on July 8, 2013 2013 Regular Session Current Location: In House Committee – Current Committee: Rules. HB 2924 would have allowed counties to declare bankruptcy. It died in committee and who knows if it will be resurrected.

Br. IIIH.4.2 OR COs: 2012 Review of Fiscal Indicators (FI) 1 Local Support & 2 Timber Payment Dependence

Financial Condition Review In May 2012 the OR Secretary of State published an analysis entitled, “*Oregon’s Counties: 2012 Financial Condition Review*.”³³ Part of that report was about **how each of Oregon’s 36 counties had addressed their financial conditions as described by 10 fiscal indicators**. The reader is referred to other educational brochures for summaries of the other 8 indicators.

Indicator No. 1 Local Support Locally generated revenues need to be sufficient to meet a county’s current and future service needs. The ability to generate local revenues is dependent on several factors including property values, taxable property, and population.

Property taxes are one of the most important sources of locally generated revenues for a county. Property taxes are composed of three primary parts: 1) permanent rate and gap bond levies, 2) local option levies, and 3) bond levies. Most taxing districts can utilize any of these three types of taxes.

The passage of statewide constitutional tax limitations in the 1990s (Measures 5, 47, and 50), established permanent rates for each taxing district. A county’s permanent tax rate is the maximum rate it can impose without approval by voters. Taxes from the permanent rates are discretionary and fund the general operating budgets of the taxing districts. They account for the single largest component of property taxes. The tax rate analysis does not include special taxing districts created to fund specific CO services such as enhanced law enforcement or libraries [nor for actual costs for private fire protection when public services are not available].

Between 2008 and 2011, most counties generated an average of at least \$300 per capita in local revenues. Gilliam and Sherman Counties, on average, generated the largest local revenues per capita, which were four times greater than the next highest county. Revenues generated from wind farms and/or landfill and recycling centers contributed to the high averages in these counties.

The average permanent tax rate among Oregon counties is \$2.81 per \$1,000 of assessed property value. Josephine and Curry Counties have the lowest permanent tax rates and are the only counties with rates below \$1.00. Low permanent rates combined with limited taxable property can constrain a county’s ability to raise revenues. To illustrate, Josephine County, with the lowest permanent tax rate of \$0.59 and 62% of its area in non-taxable federal lands, generated the least amount of local revenues at \$191 per capita in 2011.

Indicator No. 2 Timber Payment Dependence Revenues determine the capacity of a government to provide services to citizens and are affected by economic and policy changes. Oregon counties generate revenues from a number of sources, including other governments. The federal government provided timber payments to eligible counties for 1) loss of property tax revenue, which results from an inability to impose taxes on federally owned forest lands, and 2) reduction in the amount of logging allowed on federal forest lands.

Federal timber payments are often restricted for specific purposes such as funding schools or road maintenance. The portion of the timber payments that are not restricted can be used by the county for general operating expenditures. For purposes of our analysis, we focused this indicator solely on the portion of the federal timber payments provided through the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to 18 Oregon counties. These timber payments, known as Oregon and California (O&C) and Coos Bay Wagon Road (CBWR) payments, are generally not restricted and the availability of these moneys greatly impacts a county’s general fund. For counties that depend heavily on timber payments, the loss of this revenue source may result in cash flow problems and fewer services provided to its citizens.

Over the four-year period between 2008 and 2011, the average federal timber payments in five counties totaled more than 10% of their respective governmental fund revenues.

Br. IIIH.4.3 OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 3 Debt Burden & 4 Liquidity

Indicator No. 3 Debt Burden The issuance of debt is one strategy a county can use to provide cash to fund expenditures. However, increasing debt service (principal and interest payments on outstanding debt) reduces expenditure flexibility by adding to a county's obligations. It can be a major part of a county's fixed costs, and its increase may indicate excessive debt and fiscal strain.

A key indicator that can be used to evaluate a county's debt burden is the percentage of debt service to revenues. States recognized as having sound debt management practices typically use a range between five and eight percent of revenues. The State of Oregon uses a target of five percent.

States recognized as having sound debt management practices typically use a range between five and eight percent of revenues.

From 2008-2011, seven counties had an average debt service to governmental fund revenues percentage that exceeded five percent; however, all 36 counties were within the range recognized as sound debt management.

county's short-term financial condition is its liquidity or cash position. Cash position determines a county's ability to pay its short-term obligations by measuring the amount of cash on hand at the end of the year in relation to the amount of current liabilities. A ratio of less than one indicates the county's cash position is not sufficient to meet its short-term obligations.

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During 2008-2011, all but one county had an average cash position that was sufficient to meet their short-term liabilities. Over half of the counties showed a favorable cash position of at least 5:1, indicating the counties had a minimum of five dollars available to cover each dollar obligated

Br. IIIH.4.4 OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 5 Fund Balance & 6 Retirement Benefit Obligation

Indicator No. 5 Fund Balance Most counties rely upon property tax revenue as a primary source of income to cover operating costs for the year. The general fund unreserved fund balance helps counties cover costs from July until November, when property taxes are generally collected. A positive fund balance provides a cushion to help with revenue shortfalls or expenditure overruns. Continuous reductions in fund balance could lead to problems in the future, even if the current fund balance is positive.

Due to changes in county fund structures resulting from implementation of GASB Statement Number 54, fund balance information beginning with 2011 is no longer comparable to previous years. As a result, this indicator focused on the three-year period from 2008 to 2010. During this period, a total of 15 counties experienced decreases in their respective general fund unreserved fund balance. The most significant decrease, of about \$2 million, occurred in Linn County, which reported a negative general fund unreserved fund balance in two of the three-years analyzed. Linn County officials reported that the negative General Fund balance was a result of extensive use of interfund loans from the county's Road Fund. Twelve other counties experienced decreases of about 10% during this period.

Indicator No. 6 Retirement Benefit Obligation An unfunded liability is a liability that has been incurred during the current or a prior year that does not have to be paid until a future year, and for which reserves have not been set aside to pay the liability. It is similar to long-term debt in that it represents a legal commitment to pay at some time in the future. If such obligations are permitted to grow over a long period of time, they can have a substantial effect on a county's financial condition. This indicator measures the burden of a county's unfunded actuarial liability associated with its pension and other post-employment benefit plans (OPEB) on its citizens.

In 2011, Sherman and Gilliam Counties had the largest total pension benefit obligations, both exceeding \$900 per citizen. The average obligation in 2011 was \$302 per capita. Pension plans in three counties were fully funded. Fully funded plans are those with no outstanding liability. Counties with retirement benefit obligations per capita of \$0 or less are considered fully funded. A negative amount indicates a county that is more than 100% funded. This generally occurs when pension bonds were issued to reduce the county's retirement obligation.

Br. IIIH.4.5 OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 7 Public Safety & 8 Personal Income

Indicator No. 7 Public Safety Public safety is a primary responsibility of a county to ensure that its citizens are protected. Between 2008 and 2011, Sherman and Gilliam Counties significantly out spent all other counties for public safety related activities. On the other hand, Yamhill and Benton Counties spent the least on public safety during these years.

Indicator No. 8 Personal Income Personal income per capita is one measure of a county’s ability to raise taxes: the higher the per capita income, the more property tax, income tax, and business tax the county can generate. If income is evenly distributed, a higher per capita income will usually mean a lower dependency on government services such as transportation, health, recreation, and welfare. A decline in per capita income causes a drop in consumer purchasing power and can provide advance notice that businesses, especially in the retail sector, will suffer a decline that can ripple through the rest of the county’s economy.

Income data for 2009 was the latest available; based upon 2009 figures, the per capita personal income among Oregon’s 36 counties ranged from about \$24,000 to \$44,000. Every county experienced increases in per capita personal income over the period from 2000-2009. Gilliam and Sherman Counties had the largest gains over that decade, with increases of about 80%.

Public Safety Spending Per Capita	
4-Year Average, FY 2008 - 2011	
Yamhill	\$150
Benton	\$159
Coos	\$163
Columbia	\$185
Polk	\$188
Jackson	\$205
Marion	\$209
Lane	\$209
Curry	\$210
Douglas	\$216
Union	\$219
Josephine	\$221
Crook	\$223
Hood River	\$229
Washington	\$229
Klamath*	\$234
Wallowa	\$249
Malheur	\$249
Wasco	\$251
Clackamas	\$255
Grant	\$259
Umatilla	\$265
Tillamook	\$271
Linn	\$271
Harney	\$274
Baker	\$282
Jefferson	\$287
Multnomah	\$297
Lake	\$341
Lincoln	\$365
Clatsop	\$371
Deschutes	\$439
Morrow	\$478
Wheeler	\$522
Gilliam	\$807

The 2009 per capita personal income among Oregon’s 36 counties ranged from about \$24,000 to \$44,000.

Br. IIIH.4.6 OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 9 Population Trends & 10 Unemployment

Indicator No. 9 Population Trends Population change can directly affect governmental revenues. For example, some taxes are collected on a per capita basis, and many intergovernmental revenues and grants are distributed according to population. A decline in population would, at first glance, appear to relieve the pressure for expenditures, because the population requiring services is smaller. In practice though, a county faced with population decline is rarely able to make reductions in expenditures that are proportional to the population loss.

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During the 60-year period from 1950 through 2010, most counties experienced an overall growth in population. Populations more than doubled during this period in 17 counties, while an additional six counties saw an increase of over 50% in their respective populations. Deschutes and Washington Counties experienced the largest shifts in population with increases of 135,921 (623%) and 468,441 (765%), respectively.

A number of counties, however, experienced declines in total population during this period. Wheeler, Gilliam, Sherman and Grant Counties all experienced declines greater than 10%. Wheeler and Gilliam Counties were impacted the most with decreases of 1,872 (57%) and 946 (34%), respectively.

The percentage of individuals living in the county who are under 20 and over 64 is a measure of the county's needs, as these population groups tend to require more services than the average working individual.

Certain age groups within a county's population require more resources than others. A high percentage of citizens in these age groups may be an indication of future financial stress within the county. The percentage of individuals living in the county who are under 20 and over 64 is a measure of the county's needs, as these population groups tend to require more services than the average working individual. In contrast, individuals between the ages of 20 and 50 generally require fewer services while at the same time contributing the most revenue.

From 1950 to 2010, most counties saw an increase in the population of 20-50 year olds. Significant increases occurred in 13 counties where this population category more than doubled. However, in six counties this category declined about 20%. Wheeler, Gilliam, Grant and Sherman Counties experienced the greatest declines while Washington County saw the greatest gain within this age range.

During 2011, average county unemployment rates ranged from a low of 6.4% to a high of 15.8%.

Indicator No. 10 Unemployment A county's unemployment rate is a key indicator of the health of its economy, as well as, the county's long-term financial prospects. During 2011, average county unemployment rates ranged from a low of 6.4% to a high of 15.8%. The State of Oregon's unemployment rate during this period was 9.6%. Unemployment in 22 counties met or exceeded the state rate.

Br. IIIH.4.7 JO CO: 2012 Financial Condition Review

Overview Josephine County is the last county created before statehood and relies on lumber, tourism, and agriculture. Roughly 62% of its 1,641 square miles is publicly owned.

Josephine is one of the most dependent on federal timber payments, and levies the lowest property tax rate. While a number of financial management indicators, such as the county's debt burden and liquidity are positive, the majority indicate a high degree of risk. For example, the county's low property tax rate limits its ability to generate local revenues. In addition, unemployment is high and per capita personal income ranks in the bottom third among counties. Josephine's population, while steadily growing, is also aging, which could place even more financial pressure on the county's available resources.

County Response County officials report they have proactively planned for the decline in federal timber payments. Officials have also required that the majority of county programs be self-sustaining through fees, grants, state contracts, and other revenue sources that do not rely on property taxes or General Fund support. However, a recent local option levy, intended to provide funding for the county's Public Safety Fund for four years, failed to receive voter approval.

Local Support Local revenues have decreased by half since 2004, to \$14.8 million in 2011. Local revenues per capita in 2011 was the lowest in the state. The decline in local revenues is likely due to a combination of factors, including population change, economic conditions, and inflation. The county's permanent tax rate of \$0.59 per \$1,000 of assessed property value is the lowest rate in Oregon.

Timber Payment Dependence Federal timber payments decreased about 35% over the last eight years, while the county's dependence on federal timber payments increased. As revenues from all other sources declined about 43%, federal reliance grew from 19% of total governmental fund revenues in 2004 to 22% in 2011.

Debt Burden The county's debt service payments, as a percentage of total governmental fund revenues, remained stable between 2004 and 2011. This trend indicates that the county has implemented sound debt management practices.

Liquidity The county has maintained a liquidity ratio above 2.0 the last eight years. At its current level, the county has sufficient cash to meet its existing short-term liabilities.

Fund Balance The county's general fund unreserved fund balance has remained stable since 2004. As a percentage of total general fund expenditures, the general fund unreserved fund balance has increased 90% from 2004 to 2010. The primary cause for this improvement is a significant reduction in the county's general fund expenditures, which dropped from \$28.3 million in 2004 to \$3.6 million in 2010. Between 2006 and 2007 general fund expenditures decreased about \$24.9 million (91%) due in part to the creation of the Public Safety Fund.

Retirement Benefit Obligation The county provides pension and other retirement benefits to its employees. The unfunded liability and resulting per capita obligation associated with these benefits dropped significantly in 2007. However, implementation of new reporting standards for the disclosure of other postemployment retirement benefits led to an increase in per capita obligation beginning in 2009.

Public Safety County per capita spending on public safety related programs has remained relatively stable with only slight fluctuations from year to year.

Personal Income Per capita personal income levels have increased about 6% since 2004. In 2009, the county ranked in the bottom third among Oregon counties.

Population Trends In 2010, Josephine County was 12th largest among Oregon counties with a population of 82,713. The population has more than tripled since 1950. Significant increases occurred between 1970 and 1980, and again between 1990 and 2000. The county has experienced double digit growth in population in four of the last six decades. The county's population is aging. In 1950, 75% of the population was under the age of 50; however, that group represented only 54% of the population by 2010. Conversely, the population of individuals over the age of 50 increased from 25% to 46% during this same period. This shift, if continued, could reduce the size of the future workforce and also create greater demand for more provide health and social services.

Unemployment The county's unemployment rate has remained above 12% since 2009. In 2011, the county's unemployment was one of 10 highest rates in Oregon and was 3% higher than the State's rate that year.

6. Other Studies?

BLM?

B. Josephine County Sheriff's Office

See Chapter IX, Educational Brochures, Section IX.C. Facts: Josephine (JO) County (CO) Sheriff's Office.

C. Media

See Chapter IX, Educational Brochures, Section IX.E. Facts: Media.

Media articles may, or may not, contain references to relevant studies and information. What it is good at is identifying the controversies and conflicting issues. Public issues are a reasonable indication of affected conditions that should be considered as relevant.

Reporter articles are also good at identifying controversies and issues, as well as the biases of the media entity.

Guest opinions and letters to the editor concerning the evidence are not a comprehensive representation of public values, but they are the best we have a record of without an expensive public survey.

V. OREGON LEGISLATION

A. Oregon Senate Bill 77 (2009)

The 2009 Oregon Senate Bill 77 established the process to declare a public safety services emergency in a fiscally distressed county. The bill had been codified at ORS 203.095 and 203.100. Under this bill the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission (OCJC) was identified as the agency to establish the process to declare a public safety services emergency in a fiscally distressed county. The bill had been codified at ORS 203.095 and 203.100. The JS&PSS found it work sound, especially its summation of the difficulty of reviewing and analyzing public safety services provided by the county to determine whether the county is providing a “minimally adequate level of public safety services.” It had the task of writing the regulations to implement the law (i.e., OAR 213-070-000).

- Br. III.E.1.6.3.3 OR Criminal Justice Commission’s & OR Senate Bill 77

These counties suffer from a multiplier effect of structural features which could negatively affect public safety in these counties if that funding ends: (1) they have substantial percentages of their general funds dependent on the SSR funds (40-70%), (2) most of their general funds are dedicated to public safety, (3) they have relatively low property tax rates and/or receive a small percentage of the property taxes levied in that county with little legal room, or political opportunity, to increase those rates, and (4) substantial fractions of these counties are federally owned, not subject to taxation.

The last Legislature, concerned about the looming potential loss of SSR funding, enacted SB 77 relating to the declaration of a “public safety services emergency.” **In the face of such a declaration, the OCJC would be required to “review and analyze public safety services provided by the county” to determine whether the county is providing a “minimally adequate level of public safety services.”** There are substantial differences between counties in terms of, among other things, their geographic and demographic characteristics, historic crime rates and their willingness to tolerate certain levels of crime and their past and present funding of various public safety services. Given these, and other, substantial differences, writing rules for how to determine whether a particular county is providing “minimally adequate public safety services” is a difficult task indeed. **A committee of the OCJC is currently at work developing both a conceptual framework as well as draft rules to comply with the legislative directives laid out in SB 77.** The OCJC hopes to finalize the initial draft rule by the end of July, 2010.

OAR 213-070-000 [2013 Note: The OCJC was successful and OAR 213-070-000 was finalized in 2011]. You are invited and encouraged to participate in this effort by making recommendations to the CJC concerning our efforts to write the rules for determining “minimally adequate” public safety services in an affected county. **What services should be taken into account, what are the key data elements in measuring a particular public safety service and how should they be measured?** The current thought is that the rules should be such that, given the variability in counties, these rules must flexible in application while being based on uniformity in the categories and data categories utilized for any given public safety service. We look forward to your input.

B. Oregon House Bill 4176 (2012)

Oregon House Bill 4176 (2012). Relating to counties in fiscal distress; creating new provisions; amending ORS 203.095 and 203.100; repealing ORS 203.095 and 203.100; appropriating money; limiting expenditures; and declaring an emergency.

C. Oregon House Bill 3453 (2013)

Oregon House Bill 3453 (2013). Provides that the Governor of Oregon may proclaim public safety fiscal emergency for one or more counties where fiscal conditions compromise county ability to provide minimally adequate level of public safety services

D. Oregon House Joint Resolution 21 (2015)

Oregon House Joint Resolution 21 proposes an amendment to Oregon Constitution that provides that rate of ad valorem property taxes imposed by county for any property tax year may not be less than \$2.00 per thousand dollars of assessed value and excepts \$2.00 per thousand dollars minimum from compression under Ballot Measure 5 (1990). Refers proposed amendment to people for their approval or rejection at next primary election.

Oregon House Joint Resolution 21: February 4 2015

OR State Legislature page for HJR21

<https://legiscan.com/OR/bill/HJR21/2015>

Downloaded July 2, 2015

Oregon Joint Resolution: A measure used for proposing Constitutional amendments, creating interim committees, giving direction to a state agency, expressing legislative approval of action taken by someone else, or authorizing a kind of temporary action to be taken. A joint resolution may also authorize expenditures out of the legislative expense appropriations.

Status.

78th OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY--2015 Regular Session

Spectrum: Partisan Bill (? 1-0)

Status: Introduced on February 4 2015 - 25% progression

Action: 2015-06-12 - Referred to Rules by prior reference.

Pending: House Rules Committee

Text: Latest bill text (Introduced)

Summary.

Proposes amendment to Oregon Constitution that provides that rate of ad valorem property taxes imposed by county for any property tax year may not be less than \$2.00 per thousand dollars of assessed value and excepts \$2.00 per thousand dollars minimum from compression under Ballot Measure 5 (1990). Refers proposed amendment to people for their approval or rejection at next primary election.

Sponsors.

House of Delegates Committee On Revenue Committee

Salem Sets Sights on County Public Safety Funding

Consider it a shot across the bow: House Joint Resolution 21 would amend the Oregon Constitution to require every county to have a county-government tax rate of at least \$2 per \$1,000 of assessed value. The proposal appears to be in reaction to the situation in Josephine, Curry and some other counties, in which resources are insufficient to properly fund public safety agencies.

- Widdison, Kevin. July 1, 2015. *Salem Sets Sights on County Public Safety Funding*. Opinions Editor, The Grants Pass Daily Courier. Grants Pass, OR.

VI. HISTORICAL FUNDING

A. JO CO JS&PSS Funding History: 2000 - 2012

The information in Section IV.A. is from the Hugo JSEC's July 9, 2013 educational brochure - *Justice System Public Safety Services Funding History: 2000 - 2012*.

- Hugo Justice System Exploratory Committee. July 9, 2013. *Justice System Public Safety Services Funding History: 2000 - 2012*. Funding From Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS; P.L. 106-393) Disappears. Brochure IIID.2 Justice System & Public Safety Services Series. Hugo, OR.

1916 O & C Lands And County Funding The 1916 "Chamberlain-Ferris Act" which revested the O&C lands to the government distributed timber sale revenues to the O&C Railroad, the federal treasury, and the O&C Counties, such as Josephine County. In 1926 the "Stanfield Act" redistributed the funds, authorizing lump-sum transfers of \$7 million to the O&C Counties at a rate of \$500,000 per year. But this was not satisfactory to the O&C counties because they felt the acts did not mandate enough cutting and they didn't get enough revenue.

The 1937 O&C Act overhauled the timber management and revenue distribution scheme. It allowed the federal government to pay fifty percent of gross timber revenues directly to the O&C counties, plus twenty five percent (for unpaid Railroad property taxes). In 1953 Congress directed 25% of the revenue to road building and other capital improvements on the O&C lands, leaving only 50% paid to counties. These payment schemes tied timber harvests to county revenues and made county government a champion of increased logging.

2000 Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS; P.L. 106-393)

The 1937 funding arrangement lasted until the 2000 SRS which was a temporary, optional program of payments based on historic, rather than current, revenues. Because of decreased timber revenues (most of the old-growth was cut and there were T& E issues on O&C lands), The O & C counties pushed to decouple timber harvests from county revenue. The SRS provides direct payment to counties from the federal government in lieu of taxes.

2008 SRS Reauthorized Through 2011 Many counties are compensated for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. Counties with national forest lands and with certain Bureau of Land Management lands have historically received a percentage of agency revenues, primarily from timber sales. However, timber sales have declined substantially—by more than 90% in some areas. The 2008 reauthorization had a four year ramp-down in funding to expire 2012.

**Table IV.A-1. Josephine County Justice System Public Safety Services
Funding History: 2000 - 2012**

SRS Payments⁴

2000	\$12,524,049.92
2001	\$12,723,541.55
2002	\$12,393,868.10
2003	\$12,554,988.38
2004	\$12,843,753.12
2005	\$13,885,138.51
2006	\$14,023,989.89
2007	\$13,995,208.93

SRS Payments⁵

NFS Payments⁵

2008	\$12,621,591	\$2,756,526
2009	\$11,359,432	\$2,480,873
2010	\$10,237,513	\$2,235,849
2011	\$5,777,421	\$1,654,373
2012	\$5,488,568	\$1,589,434

4. Oregon/Washington BLM. Downloaded July 9, 2013. Official Payments Made to Counties: 2000 - 2011. Washington, DC (<http://www.blm.gov/or/rac/ctypaypayments.php>).

5. Partnership for Rural America Campaign. Downloaded July 9, 2013. *Oregon SRS Payments by County*. JO CO - O&C Payments (SRS Payments) & JO CO National Forest Payments). (http://www.partnershipforruralamerica.org/States/Oregon/State_Oregon.shtml)

2012 On July 6, 2012, the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 was reauthorized for federal fiscal year (FY) 2012 as part of Public Law 112-141. This one-year reauthorization of the SRS Act made some significant changes to the previous reauthorization in Public Law 110-343.

In summary, the 2000 SRS Act originally expired in 2006, was renewed for one year in 2007, for four more years in 2008, and one more year in 2012, though each renewal was at reduced spending levels.

B. JO CO JS&PSS Funding History: 2013 - 2015

Official Secure Rural Schools Payments Made to Counties
USDI, Bureau of Land Management
<http://www.blm.gov/or/rac/ctypaypayments.php>
Downloaded July 6, 2015

In May 2015, the BLM made payment to 18 counties in western Oregon eligible under the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act extension. The amount paid to the Oregon & California (O&C) counties was \$20,290,958.71. In February 2015, the BLM previously paid the O&C Counties \$18,000,344.15 for Fiscal Year 2014. The total amount paid to the O&C counties is \$38,291,302.

In April 2015, the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act was reauthorized as a part of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-10). The new language in the reauthorization of the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act extension locked-in the allocation elections made by counties for Fiscal Year 2013 for two fiscal years. The deadline to initiate a Title II or Title III project has been extended to September 30, 2017, and the deadline to obligate Title II or Title III funds has been extended to September 30, 2018

FY15 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR - BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT SECURE RURAL SCHOOLS ACT DISTRIBUTION O&C CALCULATION FY14 Secure Rural School Payments made in FY15

COUNTY	Title I*	Title II**	Title III	Grand Total
Josephine	2,174,441.57	2,998,917.08	449,857.27	5,623,215.92
	* February 13, 2015			
	** May 29, 2015			

FY2013 Receipts Distributed in FY2014 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR - BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT SECURE RURAL SCHOOLS ACT DISTRIBUTION O&C CALCULATION FY2013 Receipts, Distributed in FY2014 - Treasury Confirmation Date April 15, 2014

COUNTY	Title I	Title II	Title III	Grand Total
Josephine	\$4,858,134.61	\$457,236.20	\$400,081.67	\$5,715,452.48

FY2012 Receipts, Distributed in FY2013 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR - BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, SECURE RURAL SCHOOLS ACT DISTRIBUTION FY2012 Receipts, Distributed in FY2013 - Treasury Confirmation Date May 28, 2013 4.9% PAYMENT

COUNTY	Title I	Title II	Title III	Grand Total
Josephine	241,938.06	22,770.64	19,924.31	284,633.01

VII. JOSEPHINE COUNTY LEVIES

A. Josephine County's Tax Levies over the Years

The information in Section V.A. is from the Hugo JSEC's Very Draft September 30, 2013 educational brochure - *Josephine County, Tax Levies over the Years*. This brochure is not complete and is inadequate.

- Hugo Justice System Exploratory Committee. Very Draft September 30, 2013. *Josephine County, Tax Levies over the Years*. Brochure Br. III.D.10.4 Justice System & Public Safety Services Series. Hugo, OR.

The 2012 expiration of federal funding for services resulted in two JO CO proposed levies as a solution. The Hugo Justice System Exploratory Committee (HJSEC) believes an informed public will consider the question: "Is JO CO providing an minimally adequate level of public safety services?"

The average permanent tax rate (PTR) among Oregon counties is \$2.81 per \$1,000 of assessed property value (AV). Josephine and Curry Counties have the lowest permanent tax rates and are the only counties with rates below \$1.00. Low permanent rates combined with limited taxable property can constrain a county's ability to raise revenues. To illustrate, Josephine County, with the lowest permanent tax rate of \$0.59 and 62% of its area in non-taxable federal lands, generated the least amount of local revenues at \$191 per capita in 2011.

2007¹¹

May 2007 JO CO-wide Measure 17 - 19, Criminal Justice System Operations Four Year Local Option Tax (i.e., \$2.50 per \$1,000 of assessed value), failed 62 - 37 percent.

2004¹²

November 2, 2004 JoCo Criminal Justice System levy failed 61 - 39 percent.

*Once again, a property tax measure will be testing the endurance of Josephine County voters. This is the sixth time in 10 years that this issue has been presented to us. We voted "no" on it every time in the past and will have to vote "no" once again.*¹³

Footnote 11. Conrad, Chris. May 17, 2007. *JoCo Sheriff Hands out Pink Slips: County Makes Plans to Release Inmates after Levy's Lopsided Defeat*. Mail Tribune. Medford, OR.

Footnote 12.

Footnote 13. *County Must Learn To Live Within Its Means*. Jim Fafferty. 05/03/13. Guest Opinion. TDC. Grants Pas s , OR.

***** ?? Sources to check??

- . In 1885, the county seat was relocated to Kerby, where the county's first jail was built.
- . The 262-bed Jail was built in 2000
- . OR Public Defense Services Commission (PDSC)
- . List of Josephine County, Oregon Ballot Measures?
- . Records at the Josephine County Courthouse, Clerk's Vault: Certification of Tax Roll [includes levies], 1984-present
- . Oregon Tax Statistic, Oregon Dept of Revenue
- . Federal Court Order to stop overcrowding the JO CO jail by U.S. Magistrate Michael Hogan
- . Oregon Criminal Justice Commission
- . county's Criminal Justice System because the State Jail Inspector said our County Jail has too few staff members to house more than 170 inmates.

B. Josephine County's Tax Levies: 2012 - 2015

The 2012 expiration of federal funding in Josephine County (JO CO), Oregon, used mostly for public safety services, resulted in four tax levies as solutions. They all failed.

1. May 15, 2012 JO CO-wide Primary Election Measure 17 - 43, Criminal Justice System Operations Four Year Local Option Tax (i.e., \$1.99 per \$1,000 of assessed value), failed 57 - 43 percent, Voter Turnout - Total 52.59%; 25,405 votes for Measure 17 - 43/ 49,561 registered voters = 51%.
2. May 21, 2013 JO CO-wide Special Election Measure 17 - 49, Criminal Justice and Public Safety Three Year Local Option Tax (i.e., \$1.48 per \$1,000 of assessed value), failed 51 - 49 percent, Voter Turnout - Total 51.97%; 26,331 votes for Measure 17 - 49/ 50,944 registered voters = 52%.
3. May 20, 2014 JO CO-wide Primary Election Measure 17 - 59, Criminal Justice and Public Safety Three Year Local Option Tax (i.e., \$1.19 per \$1,000 of assessed value), failed 53 - 48 percent, Voter Turnout - Total 56.51%; 27,991 votes for Measure 17 - 59/ 50,655 registered voters = 55%.
4. May 19, 2015 JO CO-wide Special Election Measure 17-66, For Patrol, Jail, Shelter of Abused Youth; Five Year Levy (i.e., \$1.40 per \$1,000 of assessed value), failed 54 - 46 Percent, Voter Turnout - Total 50.65%; 25,824 votes for Measure 17 - 59/ 51,143 registered voters = 51%.

- [Josephine County] Past Election Results: 2012 - 2015
Josephine County Clerk and Recorder's Office Web Page: Past Election Results
<http://www.co.josephine.or.us/Page.asp?NavID=754>
- Harvey, Art: County Clerk & Recorder. Downloaded June 30, 2015. *Josephine County Past Election Results*. Josephine County, Oregon. Grants Pass, OR.
<http://www.co.josephine.or.us/Page.asp?NavID=754>.

Josephine County Clerk and Recorder's Office Web Page: Home
<http://www.co.josephine.or.us/SectionIndex.asp?SectionID=110>
Email: clerk@co.josephine.or.us

C. Josephine County's Tax Levies: 2004? - 2011

- [Josephine County] Past Election Results: 20?? - 20??
Josephine County Clerk and Recorder's Office Web Page: Past Election Results
<http://www.co.josephine.or.us/Page.asp?NavID=754>
- May 18, 2004 JO CO-wide Primary Election **Measure 17 -1 Library Levy**, failed 49 - 44.44 percent.
- November 2, 2004 JO CO-wide General Election **Measure 17 -4 Four Year Jail Operations**, failed 58.85 - 35.97 percent.
- May 17, 2005 JO CO-wide Special Election
- May 16, 2006 JO CO-wide Primary Election
- November 7, 2006 JO CO-wide General Election **Measure 17 -16 Proposed Josephine Cty. Library District**, failed 57.06 - 42.94 percent.
- November 6, 2007 JO CO-wide Special Election
- May 15, 2007 JO CO-wide Special Election **Measure 17 - 19 Criminal Justice Levy**, failed 62.5 - 37.5 percent.
- May 2008 JO CO-wide Primary Election
- November 4 2008 JO CO-wide General Election **Measure 17 - 22 Grants Pass Public Safety**, failed 50.61 - 49.39 percent.
- May 19, 2009 GP City-wide Special District Election **Measure 17 -28 Grants Pass Public Safety**, passed 66.96 - 33.31 percent.
- January 26, 2010 Oregon State Special Election
- March 9, 2010 JO CO-wide Special Election
- May 18, 2010 JO CO-wide Primary Election
- November 2, 2010 JO CO-wide General Election **Measure 17 - 35 Grants Pass Public Safety**, passed 65.21 - 34.79 percent.
- May 17, 2011 JO CO-wide Special Election
- November 8, 2011 JO CO-wide Special Election

VIII. JUSTICE SYSTEM EXPLORATORY COMMITTEE (JSEC) LETTERS TO EDITOR

A. Published

- Support Funding For Justice System While Living Within Our Means
- Facts Should Support How Safety Dollars Spent
- Which Safety Services Do We Really Need?
-

B. Contemplated

- What are the legal requirements for public safety services?
- Is JO CO providing a minimally adequate level of PSS?
- Permanent Tax Rate Versus Cumulative Equivalent Tax Rate As Bases Of Comparison
- Real Tax Rate: Dollars per \$1,000 Property Value

What are the legal requirements for public safety services?

Various citizens have stated that the first duty of government is to guarantee a reasonable level of law and order. What are the legal requirements for public safety services? The Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 is often quoted as the legal source of this public safety service. *“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”*

What are the civil and criminal powers of the federal government under the U. S. Constitution? Thomas Jefferson, in the 1798 Kentucky Resolutions is often quoted.

- Roland, Jon. 1994 *Jefferson: Federal Criminal Powers Limited*. Constitution Society. <http://www.constitution.org/jeffcrim.htm>. Downloaded July 5, 2015.

... the Constitution of the United States, having delegated to Congress a power to punish treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, piracies, and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, and no other crimes whatsoever; and it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also declared, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," therefore the act of Congress, passed on the 14th day of July, 1798, and intituled "An Act in addition to the act intituled An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," as also the act passed by them on the -- day of June, 1798, intituled "An Act to punish frauds committed on the bank of the United States," (and all their other acts which assume to create, define, or punish crimes, other than those so enumerated in the Constitution,) are altogether void, and of no force; and that the power to create, define, and punish such other crimes is reserved, and, of right, appertains solely and exclusively to the respective States, each within its own territory.

This is the classic Jefferson quote in which he succinctly states the constitutional limits on the powers of the central government to prosecute persons under criminal law for acts committed on state territory. He does not get into the "general legislative powers" of Congress over federal territories, which have been reasonably interpreted to allow broad criminal jurisdiction, but the Constitution clearly states that such jurisdiction extends only to territory not the territory of any state. One might also argue that the constitutional provision that empowers the federal government to guarantee to the States a republican form of government confers powers of criminal prosecution in the event that the federal government had to step in temporarily to govern a state in which government had failed to maintain a republican form, in which case it would be governing the state as a kind of federal territory for the duration of the emergency. The only other exception is a power to discipline military personnel for acts they might commit, including those on state territory. However, this power would not extend to nonmilitary government officials, who would be subject only to federal civil remedies or removal from office, or criminal prosecution under state law.

What are the civil and criminal powers of the state government under the U. S. Constitution? In United States constitutional law, police power is the capacity of the states to regulate behavior and enforce order within their territory for the betterment of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of their inhabitants. Under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the powers not specifically delegated to the Federal Government are reserved to the states or to the people. This implies that the Federal Government does not possess all possible powers, because some of these are reserved to the State governments, and others are reserved to the people ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_power_\(United_States_constitutional_law\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_power_(United_States_constitutional_law))).

Police power is exercised by the legislative and executive branches of the various states through the enactment and enforcement of laws. States have the power to compel obedience to these laws through whatever measures they see fit, provided these measures do not infringe upon any of the rights protected by the United States Constitution or in the various state constitutions, and are not unreasonably arbitrary or oppressive. Methods of enforcement can include legal sanctions, physical means, and other forms of coercion and inducement. Controversies over the exercise of police power can arise when its exercise by the federal government conflicts with the rights of the states, or when its exercise by federal or state authorities conflicts with individual rights and freedoms ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_power_\(United_States_constitutional_law\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_power_(United_States_constitutional_law))).

In 2012 the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission provided an invaluable service in addressing the standards and criteria to determine “*minimally adequate level of public safety services*” that will continue to be researched.

- Hugo Justice System Exploratory Committee. Very Draft August 2, 2013. *Oregon Criminal Justice Commission: Standards & Authorities*. Brochure III.E.1.6.3 Justice System & Public Safety Services Series. Hugo, OR.

The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission's purpose is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of state and local criminal justice systems by providing a centralized and impartial forum for statewide policy development and planning. The commission is charged with developing a long-range public safety plan for Oregon, which includes making recommendations on the capacity and use of state prisons and local jails, implementation of community corrections programs and methods to reduce future criminal conduct. In addition, the Commission has a role in funding and evaluating Oregon's drug courts. The commission also conducts research, develops impact estimates of crime-related legislation, acts as a statistical and data clearinghouse, administers Oregon's felony sentencing guidelines and provides staff to the advisory committees regarding asset forfeiture and racial profiling. Commission members are appointed to four-year terms by the governor and confirmed by the Senate (Criminal Justice Commission: http://www.oregon.gov/CJC/Pages/about_us.aspx).

Research to Continue. Although the CJC no longer has responsibility, it provided an invaluable service in addressing the standards and criteria to determine “*minimally adequate level of public safety services*” that will continue to be researched. Its premise follows.

There are substantial differences between counties in terms of, among other things, their geographic and demographic characteristics, historic crime rates and their willingness to tolerate certain levels of crime and their past and present funding of various public safety services. Given these, and other, substantial differences, writing rules for how to determine whether a particular county is providing “minimally adequate public safety services” is a difficult task. What services should be taken into account, what are the key data elements in measuring a particular public safety service and how should they be measured?

“Is JO CO providing a minimally adequate level of PSS?”

OREGON SENATE BILL 77 (2009) established the process to declare a public safety services emergency in a fiscally distressed county.

SB 77, Section 1. (1) If the governing body of a county or the Governor believes that the county is in a **state of fiscal distress** that compromises the county’s ability to provide a **minimally adequate level of public safety services**, the governing body or the Governor may seek a **declaration of a public safety services emergency**

OREGON HOUSE BILL 4176 (2012) Relating to counties in fiscal distress.

HB 4176 SECTION 1. ORS 203.095 (1)(a) The governing body of a county may seek a **declaration of a fiscal emergency** by requesting in writing that the Governor review and analyze state-required services provided by the county if: (A) The governing body of the county believes that the **county is in a state of fiscal distress** that **compromises the county’s ability to provide a minimally adequate level**, currently or within the next fiscal year, of any service that a county is required to provide by state law; . . .

(2) When a request for review of state-required services is made the Governor shall gather information regarding the **current level of state-required services provided by the county**; and review and analyze state-required services provided in the county to determine whether the county is providing a **minimally adequate level of state-required services**.

OREGON HOUSE BILL 3453 (2013) Provides that the Governor of Oregon may proclaim public safety fiscal emergency for one or more counties **where fiscal conditions compromise county ability to provide minimally adequate level of public safety services**.

ORS 203.095/ORS 203.100

OAR 213-070-0000/ Definitions OAR 213-070-0010

- **“Minimally Adequate Level of Public Safety Services” (MALPSS)** is that level of PSS determined to be required to provide a **reasonable level of public safety** within the CO. The Com will determine the level of services that are minimally adequate in a particular CO by following the process set forth in these rules, analyzing the contextual factors present in the county as well as the current and historical levels of PSS provided by the CO.
- **“PSS Emergency”** is a situation in which a CO is in a **state of fiscal distress** that compromises the CO’s **ability to provide a “Minimally Adequate Level of Public Safety Services.” Current Level of PSS OAR 213-070-0020** This rule defines information sources and areas of PSS such as CO jail operations and law enforcement, investigation, and patrol.

IX. EDUCATIONAL BROCHURES

Educational Brochures
Justice System & Public Safety Services Issue Scope Of Work
Justice System Exploratory Committee
Hugo Neighborhood Association & Historical Society
<http://www.hugoneighborhood.org/justicesystemexploratorycommittee.htm>

In general the publicly identified issues (i.e., Chapter III Problems/Issues) are the basis for: 1. the potential affected conditions (Appendix B1), and 2. the existing studies and information (Appendix B2). The JS&PSS Exploratory Committee's educational brochures were mostly developed in 2013. They can all be refined or updated. All that is needed is an interested citizen.

The JS&PSS Committee's self evaluation of these educational brochures, like the entire JS&PSS scope of work program, is that they are transparent and accessible to the interested public via web publishing. It also acknowledges that the "volunteer nature" of the committee results in the brochures not meeting the goals of comprehensive and systematic. A funded study design is intended to meet those goals.

In 2015 a refined set of Problems/Issues were identified: "Preliminary July 15, 2015 JS&PSS Issues" (Chapter III). They are categorized with two ideas identified by the public.

1. Consider a range of public safety funding and service level alternatives, both dollars and staff, and range of type of taxpayer, and
2. Public involvement consultation and criteria issues that should be considered in the design of alternatives.

The range of alternatives and public involvement consultation and criteria issues are extremely important in the identification of the potential affection conditions (Appendix B1). They are important enough that they are repeated from Chapter III.

JS&PSS Program Element Examples (i.e., elements of alternatives)

1. Adult Jail Beds
2. Juvenile Justice Center
3. District Attorney's Office
4. Court Services
5. Rural Patrol Deputies
6. Criminal Investigations & Related Sheriff's Office Support Services
7. Animal Protection
8. Property Tax Revenues (i.e., "x" dollars per \$1,000 assessed property value)

Range of Alternatives

- Costs of JS&PSS Increase Significantly Above Old Status Quo 2000 level Prior to SRS: More Than \$15 Million Alternative?
- Costs of JS&PSS May 15, 2012 Levy Measure 17 - 43, \$1.99 per \$1,000 Assessed Value: \$14 Million Alternative?

- Costs of JS&PSS would increase back to the Old Status Quo 2000 level Prior to SRS: Approximately \$12 Million Alternative?
- Costs of JS&PSS May 21, 2013 Levy Measure 17 - 49, \$1.48 per \$1,000 Assessed Value: \$10 Million Alternative?
- 2015 Session of Oregon Legislature, House Joint Resolution 21
- Costs of JS&PSS May 19, 2015 Levy Measure 17-66, \$1.40 per \$1,000 Assessed Value: Approximately \$9 million - \$10.5 Million Alternative?
- Costs of JS&PSS May 20, 2014 Levy Measure 17 - 59, \$1.19 per \$1,000 Assessed Value: \$8.3 Million Alternative
- No Action Alternative - Live Within Your Budget Alternative: Approximately \$7.6 Million?
- Citizens Can Provide Their Own Protection At Current Funding Alternative: No SRS Federal Payments: Approximately 3 Million Dollars?
- Unknown Timber Program Future : Approximately 5 - ? Million Dollars?
- Minimally Adequate level of public safety services Alternative (Oregon House Bill 3453 criteria)
- JO CO Declare Bankruptcy Alternative
- State Implements Oregon House Bill (HB) 3453 Alternative

Public Involvement Consultation and Criteria Considered In Design of Alternatives

- Public Safety Should Be Paid By Public
- Mistrust in Government Growing: Honesty, Transparency and Accountability
- Citizens Feel Their Voices Are Not Being Heard. What Part Of “No” Don’t They Understand?
- Rural Patrol Presence Has Not Changed From 2000 - 2015; I Don’t Feel More Unsafe Or More Safe.
- Not Fair That Only Property Owners Pay
- Opportunities Had Not Occurred To Inform Voters in a Comprehensive Non-Special Interest Fashion: Planning & Business Plan
- Cumulative Assessments Coordinated By JO CO Assessor Office Unaffordable to Many.
- Not Fair That Only Property Owners Pay
- Promote Economic Development & Education
- Permanent 58 Cents Per 1,000 JO CO Tax & Current Taxes, Fees, etc. As Identified By JO CO Assessor’s Office
- Income & Opportunities Inequity Affects Ability To Pay/Multiple Overlapping Socio-Economic Issues Affect Ability to Pay Taxes, Fees, Etc.
- City and County Residents Should Pay Their Usage Share

Publicly Identified Potential Conditions of Approval The following are examples of publicly identified potential conditions of approval, or issues that could be possibly be transformed into potential conditions of approval (mostly from The Grants Pass Daily Courier (TGPDC); Appendix A Issues).

- Public safety needs to be financially supported by public.
- Fair and balanced share of costs from all users is the goal.
- Need transparency. Ideally, people make decisions based on facts. Levies should be written in plain language, enunciating exactly where every cent will go.
- Need honesty and clarity from special interest points of view.
- Many poor people are tired, they are unable to breathe free because of levy measures year after year.
- HJR21 is latest example of questionable tactics to scare voters into voting for future safety levy.
- Trust for commissioners very low. This levy just wants us to pay more and more while the costs from the past don't change.
- Lack of trust as a reason for opposition to levies; you either do or don't trust the people elected.
- As the election draws closer, the voices in favor of passing the public safety levy get shriller and attempts to scare voters into passing it get more intense and numerous.

- It is unfortunate that those with a different opinion are belittled.
- What about repeatedly doing the same thing (i.e., same levies) and continually getting worse results?
- The TGPDC should have been a watchdog, and covered the pros and cons, including criticism of the levy's structure and insufficient implementation guidelines.
- Enough is enough. Four times rejected and commissioners don't get the message. What part of "no" don't they understand? Leave the homeowners alone and no more taxes.
- We want more sheriff's deputies, we want more jail cells, we want a juvenile justice system – just not on the backs of homeowners. It's time to figure this mess out and more taxes is not the answer.
- These taxes will not give us the protection we need as sheriff's patrols are mostly reactive, not proactive, meaning they come after the crime was committed.
- The presence of law enforcement does not promote safety. The city has a very large police department with response times in the three to four minute range. Yet for all that protection the city experiences 80 percent of the crime in the county.
- It is not that difficult to figure out what is going on. The typical homestead in the outback involves, "No Trespassing" signs, large obnoxious dogs, and an excellent likelihood that the owner has a gun. Considering these obstacles, it is unlikely a deputy responding a half-hour after the event would have any consequence whatsoever.
- Property owners recognized there was a public safety problem, but they were used to paying almost no taxes and don't want to pay more.
- For the next year, the public safety system in our county will have to figure out how to make do with the resources available.
- Public safety services will just have to operate at the level these resources will allow. It remains to be seen whether the Oregon State Police will continue to expend additional resources here to make up for our lack of sheriff's deputies, or how long taxpayers in the rest of the state will tolerate the situation.
- There's no guarantee, however, that Congress will approve another extension of county payments.
- Everyone I know who voted no on the levy did so as they felt there should be other alternatives sought other than placing the entire burden on the homeowner.
- It's about time we started talking about other alternatives. I would like to have that conversation.
- I'm sure there is a way to fund the Sheriff's Office to operate at a reasonable level and provide the services absolutely necessary, but this levy is not it.
- Is there a possibility of instituting a county-wide flat fee for every adult, 18 or older, residing in JO CO? Then maybe those who are actually using the system will also be supporting it financially.
- The levy should have been structured with two rates, one for city residents and a higher rate for county residents which would cover rural patrols.
- What is the truth about the tax levy? Lots of questions.
- The survey taken is flawed. Only 402 people were surveyed out of about 50,000 registered voters. How can that be a good representation?
- A small county sales tax or tiered income tax dedicated solely to this purpose would be better choices and spread the costs more fairly among all who will benefit.
- I have a several questions that are not in the Voters' Pamphlet.
- How can we raise money to fund our deputies?
- It's time residents stepped up like adults and paid our way. If not, look for House Joint Resolution 21 to make that decision.
- JO CO is among the poorest counties in the state, and it has a drug problem.
- The surveys revealed that most people felt safe, and that most surveyed didn't think crime would decline if taxes went up.
- A lot of people are not informed. We're just told we need taxes to be safe.
- Took issue with the presentation of 58 cents per \$1,000 as the lowest permanent rate in the state. When you add taxes for fire districts, school districts, city services and 4-H/Extension services, the overall property tax rate is certainly higher, and varies significantly, depending on where you live.
- The actual property tax for county services alone is currently 82 cents per \$1,000 — 58 cents permanent, 15.8 cents for the voter-approved jail bond from more than a decade ago, and 8 cents for three years for an Animal Control levy.

- JO CO's overall average property tax rate is \$9.48 per \$1,000 in assessed value — based on the Oregon Department of Revenue. But average rates hardly tell the whole story — tax rates vary widely within the county. Grants Pass residents pay \$6.32 per \$1,000 for city services and \$4.52 per \$1,000 for School District 7 services, out of their total of \$12.58 per \$1,000, or \$2,516 for a house assessed at \$200,000.
- Those in the county — outside of Cave Junction and not in any public fire district, have the lowest rate at \$6.01 per \$1,000, or \$1,202 on a \$200,000-assessed property. Many of them do pay an additional \$2.00, or so, per \$1,000 of assessed value private company, to Rural/Metro Fire Department for fire protection. Mine is \$1.97 per \$1,000 of assessed value which for me is an annual \$471.07.
- Crime statistics are difficult to decipher. Some good apples-to-apples statistics, when comparing JO CO to Benton County found virtually the same number of crimes (7,378 to 7,471, respectively) for almost the same number of people (82,775 to 86,785, respectively).
- Crimes against people are gradually declining nationwide. But property crimes in JO CO were 85 percent higher than the national average.
- Against levy, based on a lack of a comprehensive plan for the future.
- 22.6 percent of JO CO households made less than \$15,000 a year, and the poverty level is 21.9 percent, compared to 16 percent for the entire state.
- Two insurance agents stated rates haven't gone up for renters or property owners because of lack of public safety.
- A handful of senior citizens surveyed opposed the levy by a 2 to 1 margin. One described living in the middle of nowhere, and said it didn't matter if there were deputies or not.
- Why should I pay more taxes for them to continue to ignore us?
- Being proactive involves anticipating events and planning ahead.
- Commissioners had known for a long time the federal O&C lumber subsidy had a finite life span.
- The county and city administrators are still shooting from the hip, yet the solution is obvious. . . We need administrators who are community orientated and who are willing to get the residents involved to get city and county back on track.
- It's time to be creative and stop repeatedly trying the same failed methods. County administrators could come up with a way to give the citizens another option.
- How are retirees and the unemployed supposed to keep up?
- Property owners recognized there was a public safety problem, but they were used to paying almost no taxes and don't want to pay more.
- A fair tax is when the burden is paid by everyone.
- The fear of losing one's home to a tax lien is very real.
- We need the citizens of this county to meet at public places and start a dialogue on how to raise money for county safety.
- The argument is that we cannot attract new industry to our area until we first create a "safe" county. The opposite is true. Economic development is the driving force that will reduce crime in this county.
- An increase in local taxes, smaller than proposed in the past, must be part of a multi-pronged effort that will also include possible longer-term revenues (e.g., lottery initiative, environmentally responsible mining and mineral development efforts, timber harvesting on county-owned land, etc.).
- Keep fighting on the timber equation on federal land.
- Need drug and crime prevention programs that will make our county safer and the criminal justice system a more effective and efficient system.
- Why are new businesses moving in? New restaurants and home construction, real estate sales are up. Why are those people moving here and why that huge new hospital addition? There are expert planners behind these medical and financial additions. They plan to serve the large number of old people retiring from California, bringing their pensions with them. Why? Because JO CO taxes are a fraction of equivalent California property taxes, plus no sales tax.
- Through the county payments extension, JO CO will get about \$4.6 million for the next fiscal year. JO CO's permanent tax rate of 58 cents per \$1,000 of assessed value will generate another \$3 million or so. This compares to the \$12 million we once received through federal county payments, less than a decade ago — money that came on top of revenue generated by the permanent tax rate.

- The proposed increase from 58 cents per \$1,000 of assessed value to \$1.98 amounts to a 240 percent increase, or a 23 percent increase in the total tax bill for some rural residents.
- Much has been said about JO CO having one of the lowest property tax rates in the state, but no mention of how JO CO ranks among the 36 Oregon counties with per-capita income.
- That 58 cents per \$1,000 of assessed property value tax you now pay is not going away. It has its own permanency and you will continue to pay it even if the \$1.40 per \$1,000 levy passes.
- Currently, 30 percent are on food stamps, 35 percent on Medicaid, 7.4 percent unemployment plus those in poverty and on welfare. High school graduation rates are 64 percent. Hands down JO CO is the most impoverished county in Oregon.
- County is something of a microcosm of the national situation. The rich have all the money and the rest of us live on Social Security and food stamps. In terms of cash in the bank JO CO ranks among the top five counties in Oregon.
- I'm sick of hearing that if we don't support the levy, we are stingy and selfish and don't care about JO CO.
- My husband and I are both on Social Security. . . Every year we take money from our retirement IRA for federal taxes, state taxes and property taxes. All of the distributions are taxable. Our retirement IRA is used almost exclusively for taxes.
- The majority of people JO CO's income is less than \$20,000 a year and most can't afford to pay more property taxes.
- No mention of how JO CO ranks among the 36 Oregon counties with per-capita income. It's 29th by the way, which may explain the past failures of proposed tax increases. The average per-capita income for Grants Pass was \$16,234.
- The county pays 58 percent of the taxes and accounts for 20 percent of the crime. Grants Pass pays 41 percent of the taxes and accounts for 80 percent of the crime.
- Most of the crime is committed in the city and the city has a substantial police force, just not enough jail beds.
- A problem is paying for rural sheriff's patrols when city residents already pay a lot of taxes for city police and fire services.
- The basic argument from the county resident is we can't afford this and no new taxes.
- Well-funded city public safety doesn't have enough money to take care of their own criminals, so they want county folk to pay for it.
- The sharp contrast between the city of Grants Pass and the rest of JO CO. In some ways, the situation is similar to how Southern Oregon relates to Portland — a combination of contempt and condescension can, at times, emanate from both sides of the divide.
- There is more to this split than simply a question of who can or can't afford a tax hike. It's not like everyone living in the city is affluent and everyone living in the country is poor. There seems to be a deep philosophical rift between rural residents and those living in Grants Pass.

A. HNA&HS Educational Brochures

This section on HNA&HS educational brochures is in its development stages as of July 7, 2015. The goal is to review each brochure for potential affected conditions.

1. Educational Brochures

- Br. II.A Hugo Justice System Exploratory Committee
- Br. II.B HNA&HS Constitution
- Br. II.C All Voters & Votes Are Legitimate
- Br. II.D Government Needs Support

2. Potential Affected Conditions

- Public view of government.
- Unknowns of specific issues.
- Exploratory Committee is to independently research the JO CO JS&PSS issue and publicly provide its analysis through web page publications.
- The HNA&HS believes in the sanctity of freedom of speech and the right to vote.
- Objectives not proposed for the *Exploratory Committee* are for it to conclude there is a right or wrong answer, or to recommend how the citizens should vote on any new ballot pertaining to the issue: ya or na.
- The HNA&HS believes we need public safety services even though the form and the cost are a potential concern.
- All Voters Of “*We The People*” Are Legitimate.
- Government Needs Support. Up front the HNA&HS supports funding for a justice system, and, as necessary, that without new sources of revenue that we need to live within our means.
- The HNA&HS also believes government is a “good” necessary and not an “evil necessity” for public safety services the individual does not have the capacity for, or the will to provide.

B. Facts: Issue, Projects, Analysis

1. Educational Brochures

- Br. III.A.1 Justice System Public Safety Service Issue
- Br. III.A.2 JS&PSS Educational Brochures
- Br. III.B.1 Potential Research Projects
- Br. III.C.1 Analysis Method

2. Potential Affected Conditions

- Rising crime in JO CO in the wake of widespread layoffs in the criminal justice system.
- With no new source of revenue, more than 90 employees, most from the Sheriff's Office, were laid off.
- Preliminary Public Safety Services Research Projects
 1. Issue Including Analysis Method
 2. Historical Public Safety Services
 3. Historical Public Safety Costs
 4. Historical Public Safety Revenues
 5. Historical Public Safety Remedies
 6. Law Potentially Applicable to Issue
 8. Proposed New Public Safety Services
 7. Standards For New Public Safety Services
 8. Factual Analysis
 9. Estimate of Revenues Needed For New Public Safety Services: Historical, Actual, and/or Average
 10. Sources of Revenue

- 11. Voter Approval
- 12. State Intervention

- Information Statements Should
 - 1. Identify the information issue.
 - 2. Respond to specific issues raised by citizens.
 - 3. Identify the relevant standards or authorities.
 - 4. Identify the facts which were believed would be relied upon by the decision makers.
 - 5. Explain how those facts lead to the conclusion that the standards are, or are not, satisfied.
 - 6. State that the standards are met or not.

C. Facts: Josephine (JO) County (CO) Sheriff’s Office

1. Educational Brochures

- Br. IIID.1.1.2 JO CO Sheriff’s Mission, Vision, Goals, & Budget
- Br. IIID.1.2 Meet the Josephine County Sheriff
 - Br. IIID.1.2.1 JO CO Sheriff Seeking Stable Funding: 2008
 - Br. IIID.1.2.2 Constitution JO CO Sheriff 2nd Amendment
 - Br. IIID.1.2.3 Constitution JO CO Sheriff 10th Amendment
- Br. IIID.1.4 JO CO Sheriff’s Office History
- Br. IIID.1.5 JO CO Sheriff’s Patrol Division
 - Br. IIID.1.5.1 JO CO Sheriff’s Contracted Patrol: Marine Unit
 - Br. IIID.1.5.2 JO CO Sheriff’s Contracted Patrol: Federal Forests
 - Br. IIID.1.5.3 JO CO Sheriff’s Contracted Patrol: City of Cave Junction
- Br. IIID.1.6 JO CO Sheriff’s Rural Patrol: K-9 Unit
- Br. IIID.1.7 JO CO Sheriff’s Major Crimes Unit
- Br. IIID.1.8 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Evidence Unit
- Br. IIID.1.9 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Records Division
- Br. IIID.1.10 OR Sheriff’s Jail Command Council
 - Br. IIID.1.10.1 JO CO Sheriff’s Office Jail: 2006 - 2012
- Br. IIID.1.11 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Civil Division
- Br. IIID.1.12 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Communications Division
- Br. IIID.1.13 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Proactive Policing
- Br. IIID.1.14 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Integrated Fire Plan
- Br. IIID.1.15 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Animal Evacuation & Sheltering
- Br. IIID.1.16 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Flood Preparedness
- Br. IIID.1.17 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Community Outreach
- Br. IIID.1.18 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Police Memorial
- Br. IIID.1.20 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Volunteers
 - Br. IIID.1.20.1 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Reserve Unit
 - Br. IIID.1.20.2 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Mounted Posse
 - Br. IIID.1.20.3 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Volunteer Unit
 - Br. IIID.1.20.4 JO CO Sheriff’s Office: Search & Rescue
- Br. IIID.2 Justice System Public Safety Services Funding History: 2000 - 2012

2. Potential Affected Conditions

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D. Facts: JO CO Justice System Public Safety Services

1. Educational Brochures

- Br. IIID.3 Justice System Public Safety Services Staff History: 2000 - 2012
- Br. IIID.4
- Br. IIID.5.3 Voter Response to 2013 Measure 17-49 JS&PSS Proposal

2. Potential Affected Conditions

E. Facts: Media

1. Educational Brochures

- Br. IIID.6.1.1 Citizens' Write January - May 2013
- Br. IIID.6.1.2 Citizens' Write June 2013
- Br. IIID.6.1.3 Citizens' Write July 2013
- Br. IIID.6.1.4 Citizens' Write August 2013
- Br. IIID.6.1.5 Citizens' Write September 2013
- Br. IIID.6.2.1 Coverage by The Grants Pass Daily Courier: Jan - May 2013
- Br. IIID.6.2.2 Coverage by The Grants Pass Daily Courier: June 2013
- Br. IIID.6.2.3 Coverage by The Grants Pass Daily Courier: July 2013
- Br. IIID.6.2.4 Coverage by The Grants Pass Daily Courier: August 2013
- Br. IIID.6.2.5 Coverage by The Grants Pass Daily Courier: September 2013
- Br. IIID.6.3 Coverage by The Oregonian: February - July 2013
- Br. IIID.6.4 Coverage by California Newspapers
- Br. IIID.6.5 Coverage by Other Media
- Br. IIID.7.1 First Amendment Coverage in The Daily Courier
- Br. IIID.7.2 JO CO Sheriff's "Rural Patrol"
- Br. IIID.7.2.1 JO CO Sheriff's "Rural Patrol" Coverage
- Br. IIID.7.2.2 JO CO Sheriff's "Rural Patrol" Statistical Analysis
- Br. IIID.7.3 JO CO Sheriff's Rural Patrol Reserve
- Br. IIID.7.4
- Br. IIID.7.5 JO CO Historical Costs of Public Safety Services
- Br. IIID.7.6.1 JO CO Best Public Safety Services Our Tax Dollars Can Buy: Standards & Authorities

2. Potential Affected Conditions

F. Facts: Demographics, Budgets, & Taxes

1. Educational Brochures

- Br. IIID.8.4 OR Health Care, Prison Numbers, PERS Retirement System, Tax Expenditures
- Br. IIID.8.4.1 Cost of Health Care
- Br. IIID.8.4.2.1 Relentless Growth in Dept. Of Corrections (Prisons) (1 of 2)
- Br. IIID.8.4.2.2 Relentless Growth in Dept. Of Corrections (Prisons) (2 of 2)
- Br. IIID.8.4.3 Oregon Public Employees Retirement System (PERS)

Br. IIID.8.4.4	Tax Expenditures
Br. IIID.8.8	Josephine County Comprehensive Plan & Zoning
Br. IIID.10.1	City of Grants Pass, or Tax Rates: 2012 - 2013
Br. IIID.10.1	Oregon's Permanent Tax Rates
Br. IIID.10.2.1	Oregon City Size & Tax Rate
Br. IIID.10.3	Oregon State Tax Rates County Wide
Br. IIID.10.3.1	Josephine County Assessor
Br. IIID.10.3.2	Taxes Example
Br. IIID.10.3.3	
Br. IIID.10.3.4	Josephine County, or Net Taxable Rate, Including History Before and after Housing Bust
Br. IIID.10.3.5	Josephine County, OR Net Tax Rate Adjusted
Br. IIID.10.4	Tax Levies Over The Years

2. Potential Affected Conditions

G. Facts: Criminal Offenses, Citizen Involvement, & Government

1. Educational Brochures

Br. IIID.11	Types of Criminal Offenses: Felonies, Misdemeanors and Infractions
Br. IIID.12	Citizen Advocacy Strategies
Br. IIID.12.1.1	Groups Concerned with the JO CO JS&PSS Issue
Br. IIID.12.1.2	Individuals: Pro, Con, & Neutral
Br. IIID.12.1.3	Constitutional Party of Josephine County
Br. IIID.12.1.4	Grants Pass Chapter of John Birch Society
Br. IIID.12.1.5	We're for a Constitutional Government PAC
Br. IIID.12.2.1	Trust & Ownership by Citizens
Br. IIID.12.2.2	Trust Me, I Understand
Br. IIID.13	Josephine County Government: Elected Officials, Departments
Br. IIID.13.1	Josephine County JS&PSS Issue: Elected Officials
Br. IIID.13.2	Josephine County Board of County Commissioners
Br. IIID.13.3	Josephine County JS&PSS Issue: Departments

2. Potential Affected Conditions

H. Facts: Standards

1. Educational Brochures

Br. IIIE.1.1	United States Constitution
Br. IIIE.1.2	US Bill of Rights
Br. IIIE.1.3	US Declaration of Independence
Br. IIIE.1.4	Oregon Constitution
Br. IIIE.1.5	Josephine County Home Rule Charter
Br. IIIE.1.6	Oregon Agencies & Public Safety Services
Br. IIIE.1.6.1	Oregon Attorney General
Br. IIIE.1.6.2	Oregon Legislative Counsel
Br. IIIE.1.6.3	Oregon Criminal Justice Commission

Br. III.E.1.6.3.1	OR Criminal Justice Commission & 2009 OR Governor's Reset Cabinet
Br. III.E.1.6.3.2	OR Criminal Justice Commission's Public Safety Subcommittee Report
Br. III.E.1.6.3.3	OR Criminal Justice Commission's & OR Senate Bill 77
Br. III.E.1.7	OR'S Minimally Adequate Public Safety Services Standards
Br. III.E.1.7.1	Oregon Senate Bill (SB) 77: 2009
Br. III.E.1.7.2	Oregon House Bill 4176 (2012)
Br. III.E.1.7.3.1	Enrolled Oregon House Bill 3453: 2013 (1 of 2)
Br. III.E.1.7.3.2	Oregon House Bill 3453 (2 of 2)
Br. III.E.1.8.1	Oregon Administrative Rules (OAR) 213-070-000: 2011
Br. III.E.1.8.2	Oregon Administrative Rules (OAR) 213-070-000: 2013
Br. III.E.2.1	Standards: JS&PSS Historical Costs
Br. III.E.2.2	Standards: JS&PSS Comparison Costs
Br. III.E.2.3	Actual or Average Costs
Br. III.E.3.1	Defining JO CO's Public Safety System Taxpayer Driver
Br. III.E.3.2	CO Required to Maintain Some Minimal Level of PSS Regardless of Funding Constrains?
Br. III.E.3.3	OR Governor's Reset Cabinet
Br. III.E.3.4	Best JO CO Public Safety System Our Tax Dollars Can Buy

2. Potential Affected Conditions

I. Alternatives

1. Educational Brochures

Br. IIIG.1	Adequate Information & Analysis Methodology
Br. IIIG.1.1	Adequate Analysis: Information Is Understood or Not
Br. IIIG.1.2	Adequate Analysis: Supporting Arguments Are Made or Not
Br. IIIG.1.2.1	Adequate Analysis: Standard(s) of Review
Br. IIIG.1.2.2	Adequate Analysis: Applicable Evidence/Facts
Br. IIIG.2	Adequate Information Analysis Process
Br. IIIG.2.1	Adequate Analysis: Historical PSS Services & Costs
Br. IIIG.2.2	Adequate Infor Analysis: Enrolled Oregon House Bill 3453
Br. IIIG.2.3	
Br. IIIG.2.4	Adequate Analysis: Lack of Confidence and Trust in Government
Br. IIIG.2.5	Adequate Analysis: Taxes
Br. IIIF Range	JS&PSS Planning Alternatives - Proposals
Br. IIIF. 1	Alternative 1: No Action Alternative
Br. IIIF. 2	Alternative 2: 2012 JO CO-wide Measure 17 - 43 for Criminal Justice System Operations Tax
Br. IIIF.3	Alternative 3: 2013 JO CO-wide Measure 17 - 49 for Criminal Justice and Public Safety Tax
Br. IIIF.4	Alternative 4: Minimally Adequate Alternative
Br. IIIF.5	Alternative 5: Modally Adequate Alternative
Br. IIIF.6	Alternative 6: Declare Bankruptcy
Br. IIIF.7	Alternative 7: House Bill (HB) 3453
Br. IIIF.8	Alternative 8: 2014 JO CO-Wide Measure for JS&PSS Tax
Br. IIIF.4.1	OR Sec. of State Financial Condition Review of OR Counties: 2012
Br. IIIF.4.2	OR COs: 2012 Review of Fiscal Indicators (FI) 1 Local Support & 2 Timber Payment Dependence
Br. IIIF.4.3	OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 3 Debt Burden & 4 Liquidity
Br. IIIF.4.4	OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 5 Fund Balance & 6 Retirement Benefit Obligation
Br. IIIF.4.5	OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 7 Public Safety & 8 Personal Income

- Br. IIIH.4.6 OR COs: 2012 Review of FI 9 Population Trends & 10 Unemployment
- Br. IIIH.4.7 JO CO: 2012 Financial Condition Review

- Br. IIIH.5 OSU'S Rural Studies Program (RSP) & JS&PPS Documents
- Br. IIIH.5.1 OSU'S RSP: Changing Federal County Payments and Rural Oregon Counties
- Br. IIIH.5.2 OSU'S RSP: Federal Forest Revenue Sharing Policies
- Br. IIIH.5.3 OSU'S RSP: State of Oregon Property Tax Policies
- Br. IIIH.5.4 OSU'S RSP: Factors Affecting County Policy Impacts and Responses
- Br. IIIH.5.5 OSU'S RSP: Changes in Funding, Staff, and Service Levels from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions by JO CO: 2005 - 2009
- Br. IIIH.5.5.1 OSU'S RSP: JO CO Funding Changes from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions: 2005 - 2009
- Br. IIIH.5.5.2 OSU'S RSP: JO CO "STAFF" Changes from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions: 2005 - 2009
- Br. IIIH.5.5.3 OSU'S RSP: JO CO "Service Level" Changes from Loss of Federal Forest Payments: Policy Decisions: 2005 - 2009

- Br. IIIH.5.6 OSU'S RSP: Anticipated Impacts on JO CO and Possible Responses from Loss of FFP: after 2009
- Br. IIIH.5.6.1 OSU'S RSP: Impacts on Well Being from Reductions in Public Safety: After 2009
- Br. IIIH.5.6.2 OSU'S RSP: Impacts on Financial & Political Implications from Loss of FFP: After 2009
- Br. IIIH.5.6.3 OSU'S RSP: Lack of Confidence and Trust in Government from Loss of FFP
- Br. IIIH.5.7 OSU'S RSP: Oregon State University Rural Study Program Conclusion
- Br. IIIH.5.8.1 OR Governor's Task Force on Federal Forest Payments and County Services: 2007

- Br. IIIH.6.1 OR Governor's Task Force (OGTF) Findings: Impacts of No Action Alternative (1 of 3)
- Br. IIIH.6.2 OR OGTF Findings: Impacts of No Action Alternative (2 of 3)
- Br. IIIH.6.3 OR OGTF Findings: Impacts of No Action Alternative (3 of 3)

2. Potential Affected Conditions

J. Public Officials & Security

1. Educational Brochures

- Br. IIIJ The Rewards & Perils Of Elected Officials
- Br. IIIJ.1 Political Rewards Of Proactive Decision Makings
- Br. IIIJ.2 Political Risk Of New Taxes Without A Vote Of The Locals
- Br. IIIK.3 Neighborhood Security Groups
- Br. IIIK.3.1 Citizens Against Crime (Cac) Patrol
- Br. IIIK.3.2.1 Securing Our Safety (SOS)
- Br. IIIK.3.2.2 SOS Board & Officers
- Br. IIIK.3.2.3 SOS Teams
- Br. IIIK.3.2.3.1 Natural Resources: Timber & Other
- Br. IIIK.3.2.3.2 Sales Taxes and Other New Tax/Fee Revenues (NOTE: this effort is halted due to public input)
- Br. IIIK.3.2.3.3 Property Tax Adjustments
- Br. IIIK.3.2.3.4 SOS Team 5: Trust, Transparency, and Education / Public Ownership and Involvement
- Br. IIIK.3.2.3.5 IIIK.3.2.3.5 - IIIK.3.2.3.13
- Br. IIIK.3.2.8.1 SOS's 11 Most Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ): 1. Problem & 2. Cost (1 of 5)
- Br. IIIK.3.2.8.2 SOS's 11 Most FAQ: 3. CO's Existing Property Taxes Spent, 4. Cost to Lodge an Inmate, 5. Cost Deputy District Attorney, 6. Discretionary Funding, & 7. # Grants Pass Police Officers (2 of 5)

- Br. IIIK.3.2.8.3 SOS's 11 Most FAQ: 8. Taxed for # GP Police Officers, 9. GP & CO Costs, 10. CO Jail & GP Jail, & 11. Property Tax System (3 of 5)
- Br. IIIK.3.2.8.4 SOS's 11 Most FAQ: Selected FAQs Of SOS's 43 FAQs (4 of 5)
- Br. IIIK.3.2.8.5 SOS's 11 Most FAQ: Selected FAQs Of SOS's 43 FAQs (5 of 5)
- Br. IIIK.3.2.12 SOS'S Mission: Provide a Citizen-Voiced Plan to Provide for a Secure, Stable and Sustainable JO CO
- Br. IIIK.3.2.12.1 SOS's Mission Standard: Provide a Citizen-voiced Plan for JO CO
- Br. IIIK.3.2.12.2 SOS's Mission Standard: Provide a Secure JO CO
- Br. IIIK.3.2.12.3 SOS's Mission Standard: Provide a Stable JO CO
- Br. IIIK.3.2.12.4 SOS's Mission Standard: Provide a Sustainable JO CO
- Br. IIIK.3.3.1 North Valley Community Watch (NVCW)
- Br. IIIK.3.3.2 NVCW Response Team
- Br. IIIK.3.3.3 NVCW Response Team Training
- Br. IIIK.3.3.4 NVCW Response Team Self-Defense Training
- Br. IIIK.3.3.5 NVCW Supports Local Neighborhood Watch Groups
- Br. IIIK.3.4 Media Coverage of JO CO Citizen Groups Against Crime
- Br. IIIK.4.1 Decisions on Second Amendment
- Br. IIIK.4.2 CATO Institute

2. Potential Affected Conditions

K. Recommendations

1. Educational Brochures

None of the following educational "recommendation" brochures were developed.

- Br. IV.B OR Governor's Task Force (OGTF) on Federal Forest Payments (FFP) and County Services: January 2009
- Br. IV.B.1 OGTF Recommendations: 2009
- Br. IV.B.2 OGTF Executive Summary On FFP & CO Services: 2009
- Br. IV.B.3 OGTF Section 1: Introduction and Overview On FFP & CO Services: 2009
- Br. IV.B.4.1 OGTF Section 12: Legal Mechanisms For Dealing With Counties In "Fiscal Distress": 2009 (1 of 3)
- Br. IV.B.4.2 OGTF Section 12: Legal Mechanisms For Dealing With Counties In "Fiscal Distress": 2009 (2 of 3)
- Br. IV.B.4.3 OGTF Section 12: Legal Mechanisms For Dealing With Counties In "Fiscal Distress": 2009 (3 of 3)
- Br. IV.B.5 OGTF Summary Of Findings And Recommendations On CO Services: 2009
- Br. IV.B.5.1 OGTF Recommendations On CO Services: 1. Overview, 2. Help Yourself, & 3. Help to COs - 2009 (1 of 4)
- Br. IV.B.5.2 OGTF Recommendations On CO Services: What the State and State Taxpayers Can Do to Help the COs - 2009 (2 of 4)
- Br. IV.B.5.3 OGTF Recommendations On CO Services: What the State and State Taxpayers Can Do to Help the COs - 2009 (3 of 4)
- Br. IV.B.5.4 OGTF Recommendations On CO Services: Feds Can Better 1. Share Resources and Revenues & Manage Federal Forest Lands, & 2. Legal Mechanisms for Facing "Fiscal Distress"(4 of 4)
- Br. IV.D Oregon County-Wide Solutions - Recommendations
- Br. IV.D.1 How JO CO Has Addressed its Financial Condition

2. Potential Affected Conditions

X. JSEC HARD-COPY ARCHIVES: 2012 - 2015

The JS&PSS Exploratory Committee's (EC) (JSEC) archives are not considered to be comprehensive, but there are substantial enough that they should be considered in the design and content of the study.

A. Neighborhood Groups

B. Media

1. The Grants Pass Daily Courier (TGPDC) Articles
2. Letters To The TGPDC Editor
3. Guest Opinions In TGPDC
4. Other Media Coverage

C. Studies & Information

1. Papers
2. JO CO Sheriff's Office

D. JSEC Educational Brochures

E. Other

XI. STUDIES & INFORMATION SUMMARY

XII. PUBLIC REVIEW

A. Public Review

As of July 7, 2015 this document was in the development phase represented three overlapping stages of the document development life cycle: 1. Requirement Analysis, 2. Designing, and 3. Developing Content. This document has been web published for the convenience of the authors in reviewing its requirements, designing, and content.

At this stage it's form is not final, nor is it edited for public review and comment. However, those interested members of the public may provide observations and comments on this document to the authors. Per their inclination, and if they are interested in becoming involved with the work of the Hugo JS&PSS Exploratory Committee, they may apply for committee membership with the authors (Chpt XIII).

B. Document Development Life Cycle

For the authors' purpose the following "Document Development Life Cycle" (DDLC) is considered the life cycle of a documentation task. The information on the DDLC was adapted from Wikipedia to illustrate where the authors were in document development.

Document Development Life Cycle
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DDLC>
Downloaded July 8, 2015

There are six stages to the DDLC.

1. Requirement Analysis
2. Designing
3. Developing Content
4. Editing/Proof-Reading
5. Publishing Document
6. Maintenance

As of July 7, 2015 this document represented three overlapping stages of the DDLC.

1. Requirement Analysis
2. Designing
3. Developing Content

1. Requirement Analysis The "Requirement Analysis" is an important stage of the DDLC. In this stage the technical writer gathers the useful material for the project and understands and analyzes all the information of the project.

It is the first stage of DDLC in which a technical writer analyzes the document requirements, targeted audiences and documentation tools for use throughout. Intended towards the audience level of consumption the technical writer will decide the complexity and depth of the document. Use of language level will be decided at this stage.

The process involves a lot of effort. Information is collected from various sources connected with the project, mainly with the subject-matter expert(s) (SME). Any earlier versions of the document can also be reviewed for better understanding of the project. Technical writers also search related information from the JS&PSS Exploratory Committee's archives (i.e., both hard-copy and web published), and gather updated information.

Technical writers must list down all the queries and problems faced while studying or understanding the conceptual document. They may have to meet and/or contact members of the interested public a number of times to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the project. At the end of this stage a technical writer must have resolved all the problems and queries in terms of documenting this understanding for a specific audience(s).

2. Designing At this stage some estimates are decided like approximate pages, format of the document, several representation styles, etc. Subject knowledge, good writing skills, sufficient information about the project will help the technical writer to make a quality document.

3. Developing Content At this stage content is developed as per the design prospective and in accordance with planning of the documents at previous stages. The use of graphical illustrations are recommended for a better understanding by the public.

4. Editing/Proof-Reading At this stage, the document is thoroughly read by the writers/authors, and also verified by a third party. It checks for all sorts of grammatical errors. This verification ensures that the document is ready for publishing, including web publishing.

5. Publishing Document The document is web published by parent authority of the document (i.e., HNA&HS). Generally technical documents are published either in digital format on internet or in hard-copies and distributed. Several publication options can be used as per the distribution document requirement.

6. Maintenance At this stage collection of further updates and modification can be accomplished.

XII. AUTHORS

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